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I. IN RODUCTION
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988' (OTCA)
requires the Treasury Department to report every four years on the ways
in which foreign countries discriminate against U.S. banking and securi-
ties firms.2 If a government is found to discriminate against U.S. banks,
the President (or Presidential designee), "when advantageous," must hold
discussions aimed at securing access to foreign markets for U.S. banks
and securities firms.3 The proposed Fair Trade in Financial Services Act
(FTFSA) seeks to "strengthen the Treasury's hand in any such negotia-
tions."4 The FTFSA has traveled to the brink of passage several times,
only to fail despite wide-spread expectations of success.' It was re-intro-
duced in late 1993, and is expected to become law due to bi-partisan sup-
port in Congress and backing by the Clinton Administration.6
The FTFSA authorizes two penalties for nations that discriminate
against the United States in financial services: first, preventing their banks
that currently have operations in the United States from expanding;7 and
second, prohibiting entry to the U.S. market for their banks that currently
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1995).
22 U.S.C. § 5352 (1988) (Quadrennial Report on Foreign Treatment of U.S.
Financial Institutions).
2 Id.
3 22 U.S.C. § 5353 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
' Fair Trade in Financial Services Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means 102 Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 21 (1991) (Sponsored
by Senator Donald Riegle of Michigan and Representative Charles Schumer of New
York) [hereinafter Hearings]. See Robert M. Garsson, Bills to Foster Fair Financial
Trade Revived With Backing in Both Parties, Administration, AM. BANKER, Oct. 12,
1993, at 3.
' Hearings, supra note 4, at 9. Aaron Pressman, Bill to Cut Trade Barriers in
Financial Services Dies, INvESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Oct. 19, 1992, at 10.
6 Garsson, supra note 4, at 3. Robert M. Garsson, Bottleneck In Congress for Two
Major Banking Bills, AM. BANKER, July 21, 1994, at 1.
" H.R. 3248, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993) (adding § 18(e)(1)(c) to the Inter-
national Banking Act of 1978).
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do not have a U.S. presence.8 In essence, this act would allow the
Treasury to abandon the current U.S. policy of "unconditional national
treatment"9 for foreign banks that is embedded in the International
Banking Act of 1978.1" The FTFSA would instead transform U.S. policy
to one of reciprocal national treatment."
While supporters of the FTFSA express concern about closed markets
in developing countries such as Korea and Taiwan, 2 the FrFSA's clear
target is Japan. 3 Its inspiration, at least in part, is the provocative set of
facts regarding the comparative ownership of banking assets worldwide by
U.S. and foreign interests. 4 For example, U.S. banks control $230 bil-
lion in banking assets in Europe, while European banks and corporations
control $184 billion of these U.S. assets. 5 In Japan, however, the U.S.
controls only $19 billion of banking assets, while the Japanese control
$434 billion in U.S. assets. 6 The relative magnitude of the U.S.-Japanese
imbalance is perhaps even more striking: the United States controls one
percent of Japan's banking market, while Japan has fifteen percent of the
U.S. market, and approximately twenty-five percent of the market in Cali-
fornia. 7
Further inspiring the FTFSA is the decline in the number of U.S.
banks on the list of the world's largest banks. Thirty years ago most of
the world's largest banks were American, yet today no American banks
are ranked among the top twenty (the largest U.S. bank, Citicorp, ranks
only thirty-second); 8 in contrast, Japan dominates the list of the world's
' Id. at § 18(e)(1)(c).
The practice of applying the same regulations, and no more, to foreign companies
as domestic ones without requiring the same in return. "National treatment" is the ap-
proach to commercial regulation "under which foreign enterprises are treated as
competitive equals with their domestic counterparts" and establishes "parity of treatment
between foreign and domestic banks in like circumstances." Conference of State Bank
Supervisors v. Conover, 715 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing S. REP. No. 1073,
95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2 (1978)).
10 12 U.S.C. § 3101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) [hereinafter IBA]; Hearings, supra
note 4, at 8.
" "Under this policy [reciprocal national treatment], we demand that foreign govern-
ments give American firms operating in their market the same economic opportunities
offered to foreign firms in our market. It is the Golden Rule of international trade."
Hearings, supra note 4, at 26 (statements of Congressman Richard Gephart).
,2 Id. at 15.
" Garsson, supra note 4, at 3. See generally Hearings, supra note 4.
I d. at 11.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 id.
" Ranking the World's Largest Banks, INSTrrJTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1993, at 115,
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largest banks, owning thirteen out of twenty of them.'
This Note examines the assumptions underlying the FTFSA to
determine if it can successfully eliminate this imbalance and force Japan
to rid itself of discriminatory trade practices. The Note examines the idea
that the imbalance is not simply the result of Japanese regulatory protec-
tionism, but the result of macroeconomic factors, U.S. regulatory choices,
and historical happenstance. Moreover, as the Note further concludes, the
FTFSA is founded on the erroneous notion that the imbalance is harmful,
when it has, in fact, provided benefits to the United States. Therefore, the
FTFSA is misguided because it incorrectly places the cause of the
imbalance and seeks, through provocative means, to "correct" a situation
that does not require correction.
In Section II, the provisions of the FTFSA are discussed with regard
to banking (provisions relevant to the securities industry, also contained
in the FTFSA,2° will not be addressed). Section III explores the legality
of the FTFSA under international law. Section IV proceeds to examine
the validity of key assumptions on which the FTFSA is based. Several
topics discussed in this Section include the impact of discriminatory trade
practices on asset imbalance and the effect of regulations, both Japanese
and American, on that imbalance. Section V reviews factors other than
discrimination that may influence the asset ownership imbalance. Section
VI tests the presumption that the asset imbalance is a danger to the
United States. Section VII discusses the consequences of the FTFSA and
contains the Note's conclusion that the FTFSA is unwise and should not
become law.
II. THE FTFSA
The FTFSA2  is intended to "encourage foreign countries to accord
national treatment to U.S. Banks and Bank Holding Companies that
operate or seek to operate in those countries."22 "National treatment"
occurs when a foreign country offers U.S. banking organizations the
"same competitive opportunities (including effective market access) as are
118 [hereinafter World's Largest Banks].
"9 Id. See also Clemens P. Work & Douglas Stanglin, Is Bigger Better in Banking,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 12, 1987, at 52-54; James R. Kraus, Foreign Banks
Still Seizing Greater U.S. Market Share, AM. BANKER, Feb. 27, 1990, at 1 (noting that
Japanese banking assets in the U.S. amount to more than eight times the amount of the
second place Italians).
20 H.R. 3248, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993).
2! H.R. 3248, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter FTFSA].
22 Id. § 2 (adding IBA § 18(a)).
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available to its domestic banking organizations." In identifying foreign
countries that discriminate against U.S. banks, the Secretary of Treasury
is not limited to the official report as required by the Omnibus Trading
Act of 1988,24 but may inquire into recent information that the Secretary
deems important.'
Moreover, in determining if a foreign state denies national treatment
to U.S. banks, the Secretary may look at such factors as the size of the
foreign country's market;' the extent to which U.S. banks are operating
or wish to operate there;27 and the extent to which U.S. banks may
participate in the development of the foreign nation's rules and regula-
tions." The Secretary is also directed to consider the availability of a
nation's rules to the public and the degree to which they are objectively
applied. However, no such determination may be made if it is inconsis-
tent with prior bilateral or multilateral agreements."
If a determination is made that a foreign nation is not providing
national treatment to U.S. banking organizations and that the denial of
this treatment is having a significant adverse effect on U.S. banks,3' the
Secretary must consult with the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary
of State, and "any other department or agency that the Secretary deems
appropriate" and, after such consultation, must publish the determination
in the Federal Register. 2 (Such a finding by the Secretary, in contrast to
the OTCA,33 must be reviewed at least annually.)34 Further, the Secre-
tary must inform the bank supervisors of each American state of his find-
ings.35
If a determination has been made that a nation discriminates against
U.S. banks and this fact has been published in the Federal Register, then
applications by banks to U.S. banking authorities36 made by that foreign
3 Id. (adding IBA § 18(i)(3)). See supra note 9.
24 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
SFTFSA, supra note 21, § 2 (adding IBA § 18(2)(b)(2)).
26 Id. (adding IBA § 18(c)(2)(a)).
27 Id.
28 Id. (adding IBA § 18(c)(2)(b)).
29 Id. (adding IBA § 18(c)(2)(C)(I)(ii - iii)).
3 Id. (adding IBA § 18(d)(2)).
aI Id. (adding IBA § 18(d)).
32 Id. (adding IBA § 18(d)(1)(A)).
33 22 U.S.C. § 5352 (1988) (Quadrennial Report on Foreign Treatment of U.S.
Financial Institutions).
3' FTFSA, supra note 21, § 2 (adding IBA § 18(d)(1)(B)).
I d. (adding IRA § 18(d)(1)(C)).
The sanctions apply to a bank, branch, or other "affiliated entity that is a person
410 [Vol. 27:407
EVALUATION OF THE FTFSA
nation to expand operations or open operations in the United States37
may, with concurrence of the Treasury Secretary,38 be denied.39 There
is a general exception provided for any nation meeting or exceeding the
provisions of the Second Banking Directive of the European Communi-
ty.' The imposition of these sanctions is discretionary with the Sec-
retary, and the Secretary is specifically directed to consider, in exercising
this discretion, the extent to which a foreign nation is progressing towards
offering U.S. banks national treatment41 and the extent to which U.S.
banks can operate, even if it is with less than national treatment.42
If a determination is made, the Secretary must initiate negotiations
with the foreign state to achieve national treatment,43 and, even without
an official determination, may initiate negotiations with countries that
deny U.S. banks such treatment.' However, negotiations are not required
if the Secretary should deem them fruitless. If this is true, he must notify
the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the
House's Finance and Urban Affairs Committee. 45
of that country." Id. § 2 (adding IBA § 18(E)(2)(A)). "Persons" of the foreign country
include banks organized in the foreign country, a bank with its principal place of busi-
ness in the foreign country, and subsidiaries in the United States owned by foreigners.
Id. (adding IBA § 18(I)(4)(A),(B),(D)). See also 12 U.S.C. § 3101(7) (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992) ("any company organized under the laws of a foreign country . . .which en-
gages in the business of banking").
" "[C]onduct business from any location at which" the bank was not conducting
before the determination, or "commence any line of business in which [the bank] was
not engaged" when the determination was made. FTFSA, supra note 21, § 2 (adding
IBA § 18(e)(2)(A)(I-Il)).
" The proper authority in the case of banks not insured by FDIC, but which are
members of the Federal Reserve, is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve; in
the case of insured banks, it is the Board of Governors of Federal Reserve, as defined
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Id. (adding IBA § 18(I)(1)(A & B)).
I d. (adding IBA § 18(e)(1)(C)).
Id. (adding IBA § 18()(1)). The Second Banking Directive is defined as "the
coordination of laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to the taking up
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending directive 77/789/EEC
(89/646/EEC)." Id. (adding IBA § 18(l)(5)).
41 Id. (adding BA § 18(f)(2)(A)).
42 Id. (adding IBA § 18(f)(2)(B)).
Id. (adding IBA § 18(g)(1)(A)).
4 Id. (adding BA § 18(g)(1)(B)).
I d. (adding IBA § 18(g)(2)).
1995]
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Im. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
A. United States-Japan Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty
The United States-Japan Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty (FCN) 6 provides that "[e]ach Party reserves the right to limit the
extent to which aliens may within its territories establish, acquire interests
in, or carry on ... banking involving depository or fiduciary func-
tions. . .4" This reservation establishes that, for banking, national
treatment is not obligatoryY However, it is circumscribed in two ways.
First, "new limitations imposed by either Party upon the extent to which
aliens are accorded national treatment, with respect to carrying on such
activities within its territories, shall not be applied against enterprises
[owned or controlled by the other Party] which are engaged in such
activities .. .at the time such new limitations are adopted." '49 Second,
with regard to the reserved classes of activities, "companies of either
Party, as well as enterprises controlled by such [companies] shall in any
event be accorded most-favored-nation treatment." 0 These exceptions
apply to both branches of banks organized in the other country and
subsidiary banks in the United States that are controlled by a company
organized in Japan."1
' Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of
America and Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 206 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter FCN].
4' Id. at art. VII(2).
4 "Nationalistic fervor of the post-war era. prevented universal application of the
national treatment rule. Thus, in sensitive areas where the host country could not ignore
the divided loyalties of foreigners .... .. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353,
359-60 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, Sumitomo Shoji America v.
Avagliano et al., 457 U.S. 176, 189, (1982).
4 FCN, supra note 46, at art. VII(2).
The treaty defines "national treatment" as "treatment accorded within the territories
of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like
situations, to nationals, companies, . . .of such Party." Id. at art. XXII(1).
o Id. at art. VII(4).
"Most-favored-nation treatment" is defined by the FCN as "treatment accorded
within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment
accorded therein, in like situations, to ...companies. . . of any third country." Id. at
art. XXII(1).
In sensitive industries, the Parties were reluctant to award national treatment privi-
leges, but were granted the lesser protection of most-favored-nation status. Spiess, 643
F.2d at 360.
", In Sumitomo Shoji America v. Avagliano et al., 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982), the
Supreme Court held that for purposes of art. VII(l) of the FCN, subsidiary companies
organized in the United States and owned by the Japanese were American, not Japanese
EVALUATION OF THE FTFSA
The FTFSA may breach these restrictions in two ways. First, the
FTFSA provides that if Japan is found to be discriminating against U.S.
banks, Japanese banks currently operating in the United States may be
prevented from expanding their operations here 2 Hence, the FCN's
protection accorded to established enterprises from "new limitations"
would be violated. Second, the FTFSA provides that Japanese banks not
currently operating in the United States would be prevented from estab-
lishing operations in the United States if Japan nation was found to be
discriminating against U.S. banks5 3 Application of this portion of the
FTFSA against Japan may violate the FCN's most-favored-nations provi-
sion, because banks of nations not found to be discriminating against the
United States would be permitted access to the U.S. market; 4 meaning
in short, that Japan would be subject to less favorable treatment than
other nations. Therefore, application of the FTFSA's sanctions may cause
the United States to breach its obligations under the FCN 5
The FCN provides that disputes between the United States and Japan
as to interpretation and application of the FCN will, if not solved by
diplomacy, be submitted to the International Court of Justice for resolu-
tion. 6 Thus, the. Japanese may, if the sanctions of the FTFSA are ap-
plied against it, seek resolution by the International Court of Justice. 7
The Japanese may also resort to "reprisals." '58 Although a material breach
companies. The Supreme Court based its holding, in part, on the fact that art. VII(2)
contained language making it applicable to enterprises which were "owned or controlled
by" nationals of the other Party, while art. VII(l) did not. Id. at 182 n.8. The clear
intention of the parties, then, was that subsidiaries were not to be protected under art.
VII(l) provisions, but were included within art. VII(2). Id. at 185-87.
" FrFSA, supra note 21, § 18(e)(2)(A)(I).
51 Id. § 18(e)(2)(A)(ll).
See International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. 3101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
s See Fair Trade In Financial Services Legislation: Joint Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Int'l Dev., Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy, and Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions Supervision Regulation, and Insurance, of Committee on Banking,
Finance, and Urban Affairs, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. 139-41 (1991) [hereinafter Joint
Hearing] (Prepared comments of EJ. McAllister, Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic and Business Affairs) (warning that such treaty violations would have a
number of troublesome consequences, such as uncoordinated and inconsistent use of
sanctions).
FCN, supra note 46, at art. XXIV(2).
Professor Schachter opines that when a treaty establishes rules for dispute res-
olution, reprisals, as described infra, should be restricted. OscAR ScHAcHTrR, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACrICE 192 (1991). For a discussion of the developing
law on retaliatory action prior to arbitration, see id. at 188-89.
"' Actions that would otherwise be illegal - not normally permissible under interna-
4131995]
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of a treaty obligation permits the offended party to suspend or terminate
the treaty, 9 a more typical reprisal is the selective suspension of treaty
obligations without suspension of the entire treaty.' The result is "tit for
tat"'" behavior, wherein the offended party responds in a proportionate62
and appropriate' manner to the provocation. With regard to the FTFSA
sanctions, Japan may respond by restricting American bank access to
Japan in a manner similar to that dictated by the FTFSA. However, the
reprisal need not be restricted to the field of the alleged treaty viola-
tion," and, thus, Japan may choose to take retaliatory action in some
other industry or field.
Japan may also respond with acts of "retorsion."'65 Retorsion is the
most common form of state response to a violation of a duty owed to
it' and is often the politically and practically the most successful ap-
proach. ' Reprisals or treaty suspension tend to reduce trade and invest-
ment and tend to have a greater negative impact on the parties than the
original violation.68 Thus, one possible Japanese response to FTFSA may
be a lessening of diplomatic cooperation that may impact U.S. foreign or
trade policy.
tional law - except for the breach of an international obligation by the opposing party.
Id. at 185. Examples include termination of the breached treaty in total and seizure of
state assets. Id.
" Id. at 190. Treaty suspension is an act of reprisal. Id. "Material" breach requires
something more than violation of a single term in the treaty. Id. Thus it is not clear
if the FTFSA would constitute a material breach of the FCN. See also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 616-19 (1990) (a material breach requires
a violation essential to the agreement).
60 SCHACHTER, supra note 57, at 190-91.
61 Id.
62 For a reprisal to be deemed just, it must be considered in general equality with
the acts of the offending state. Id. at 191.
6 For example, had the United States during the Iran-hostage incident in 1979-1980
responded to the Iranian actions by taking Iranian citizens hostage, the act may have
been proportionate, but it would also have been "odious" and "inhuman" and, therefore,
inappropriate. Id.
6 Id.
61 "[Actions] normally permissible for a State to take irrespective of any prior
provocation." Id. at 185. Retorsion refers to actions that a State is legally free to take
whether or not a treaty provision has been violated. Id. at 198. Examples include
"rupturing" diplomatic relations and withdrawing gratuitous benefits. Id.
6 Id. at 198.
67 Id. at 186.
' See id.
414 [Vol. 27:407
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B. General Principles of International Law
The obligations of the FCN may be terminated by either party by
giving one year's notice to the other party.69 Should this occur before
the implementation of FTFSA sanctions, there does not appear to be
general principles of international law that would render the FTFSA
wrongful. International law dealing with trade is primarily in the form of
treaties; there are few substantive areas of international economic law
derived from customary norms.70 Even the most-favored-nation princi-
ple,7' which has a history reaching back to the twelfth century,' is not
considered by most scholars and practitioners to have entered the realm
of customary international law.73 In short, absent a treaty to the contrary,
"nations presumably have the sovereign right to discriminate against
foreign nations in economic affairs as much as they wish."'74 Thus, for
example, a state is not required to admit aliens and may impose condi-
tions on their admittance; economic policies and aspects of foreign policy
may permissibly dictate restrictions on the "economic activities of foreign
enterprises."75 Under principles of international law, it is not considered
unlawful for one nation to exclude another's nationals from participating
in certain sectors of the economy or for subjecting foreign firms to
restrictions not placed on native firms.76 Moreover, economic coercion
' FCN, supra note 46, at art. XXV(3).
70 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 21-24 (1989) [hereinafter
TRADING SYSTEM]. "[W]hen dealing with international economic law, one is dealing
primarily with treaties." Id. at 23 (emphasis added). "[I]ntemational economic law . . .
is a body of principles dependent on treaties and the powers of organized states ... "
BROwNLE, supra note 59, at 261. Furthermore, international economic law "is still a
treaty law, and the problems are those of interpreting instruments." Id. at 261-62. "To
a very large extent, the legal aspects of economic relations are governed by interna-
tional agreements and practices under such agreements." SCHACHTER, supra note 57, at
300.
71 See supra note 50.
7 TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 70, at 133.
3 Id. at 23, 134.
71 Id. at 134.
7S BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 519.
76 SCHACHTER, supra note 57, at 315-16. For example, native firms are often given
preferential or exclusive rights to government contracts. Id. at 316.
In The Oscar Chinn Case (Eng. v. Belg.), 1934 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 66/5-
75/14 (Dec. 12, 1934), a British national operating a shipping business was placed in
an economically uncompetitive position when the Belgian Colonial government subsi-
dized the operations of a competitor, which was part-owned by the Belgian government.
Id. at 66/5-75/14. The British claimed that general principles of international law made
4151995]
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"appears to be seen as an acceptable, if not very nice, tactic of interna-
tional relations .. . .A State's use of its economic power for economic
or political ends has historically been viewed as legitimate."'  In sum,
there is no legal bar to the FTFSA should the FCN cease to be in effect.
1. Alternative Legal Argument
Professor Schachter argues that some discriminatory economic
treatment of foreigners does become wrongful when it is arbitrary and
unreasonable." One such form of improper discrimination79 compre-
it "incumbent upon all States to respect the vested rights of foreigners in their
[territory]" and that this obligation was violated when the Colony's subsidy to the
competitor made Chinn's business commercially impossible to operate. Id. at 81/20-
82/21. The Permanent Court of International Justice did not dispute the principle of
law, but held that the "possession of customers and the possibility of making a profit"
did not rise to the level of a vested right. Id. at 88/27. "No enterprise ...can escape
from the chances and hazards resulting from general economic conditions . . . .Where
this is the case, no vested rights are violated by the State." Id. at 88/27.
Even dissenting opinions agreed in this regard. Of the Colonial government's un-
willingness (at least initially) to extend the subsidies to all transportation operators,
including Mr. Chinn, Judge Altamira said, "[ult is true that this inequality would not,
in principle, be regarded as an injustice in the normal life of a State. It might arise,
without giving any ground for justified complaint on the part of enterprises not
admitted to participate in advantages such [as the subsidy]. . . .But, in the case of the
Congo, where the special Statute created by [treaty] is in force, the question presents
itself in a very different light." Id. at 100/39 (Dissenting opinion of J. Altamira).
Moreover, the dissenting British Judge consented on this point, stating that the
issue was "a short one which can be disposed of rapidly." Id. at 121/60 (dissenting
opinion of J. Hurst). "Chinn possessed no right [under treaty or general principle of
international law] which entitled him to find customers in the Congo." Id. at 121/60.
Thus, because Chinn's right to fulfil existing contracts was not injured, no vested right
was denied. Id. at 122161.
' Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary International Economic Law?, 1989 GERM.
Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 25-26. Zamora argues that U.S. case law indicates that U.S. courts do
not base decisions on customary principles of international economic law, although they
do reference them in a supporting role. Id. at 36-37. Zamora posits, however, that this
is not due to ideology (that somehow application of customary international law is not
democratic) but, rather, is due to practicality: courts cannot reasonably be expected to
sift through the world of customs, practices, pronouncements, etc., that would result in
finding a binding rule of customary international law. Id.
78 SCHACHTEn, supra note 57, at 316. "Arbitrary" and "unreasonable" in this context
are not well-defined and there is a "notable paucity of legal analysis" regarding them.
Id.
Zamora argues, in comparison, that customary international law controls states
economic behavior at "the extremes." Zamora, supra note 77, at 35. Examples of
416 [Vol. 27:407
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hends governmental acts based on "group prejudice" and "social ten-
sions." Schachter provides the example of Uganda taking the property of
persons of Asian dissent and the expulsion of Lebanese from Ghana."
In each case the government action amounted to aiding and abetting mobs
and was discrimination "for reasons of national origin" and "because of
ethnic or 'national origin."''8 In Schachter's view, State actions that
place restrictions on businesses owned by a disfavored ethnic group or
national because of prejudice should be regarded as unlawfully arbitrary
or unreasonable and is "a sufficient basis for international liability."82
Moreover, Schachter maintains that such discrimination is wrongful
despite an official justification based on policy; for example, such dis-
criminatory governmental conduct would not be justified in order to meet
"popular demand" or "restore social tranquillity." 3
In comparison, discrimination based on the economic characteristics
of an enterprise and its relationship with the economic policies of the
state are permissible, falling "within the sphere of State discretion."84
Such discrimination may not be unreasonable or wrongful if it is rational-
ly related to a state's economic or security policies.'5 Thus, such dis-
crimination may be permissable based on protectionism, nationalism, or
economic philosophy. In short, discriminatory measures based on eco-
nomic or policy grounds are not arbitrary or unreasonable and, therefore,
extreme behavior include permitting the counterfeiting of foreign currency and expropri-
ation of foreigner's property without compensation. Id. at 23-24, 31, 35.
The FCN expressly prohibits unreasonable or discriminatory measures: "[n]either
Party shall take unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would impair the legally
acquired rights or interests within its territories of... companies of the other Party."
FCN, supra note 46, at art. V(1).
' Schachter also discusses the impermissability of discriminatory nationalization of
property. See SCHACHTER, supra note 57, at 316-20.
1o Id. at 319.
In 1972, Idi Amin ordered all people of Asian descent (even Ugandan citizens) to
leave Uganda, claiming that they were exploiting Blacks and "milking the economy,"
and he expropriated their property. Tammerlin Drummond, Ethnic Discord; Asians
Return to Hope and Hostility in Uganda, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1993, at 2. In 1969,
Ghana ordered Syrians and Lebanese to leave the country in an effort to reduce
"undesirable aliens," especially smugglers. N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 7, 1969, at 7. See
generally Jonathan C. Randal, Mass Deportations Common in Africa; Expulsions by
Nigeria are Largest, WASH. POST, May 16, 1985, at A30.
81 SCHACHTER, supra note 57, at 319-20.
Id. at 316, 318-20.
' Id. at 319-20.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 316 (pointing to the American Law Institute's suggested standard).
4171995]
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are not unlawful.86
On initial inspection, the FTFSA seems to fit comfortably within the
category of permissible discrimination. First, the FTFSA is aimed at an
economic actor, banks, whose characteristics as a matter of U.S. economic
and national policy, have traditionally justified a high degree of regula-
tion. 7 Second, the goal of the FTFSA is to further economic and trade
policies of the United States aimed, ostensibly, at opening foreign banking
markets to U.S. companies.88 Finally, even if the FTFSA was objection-
able as protectionist legislation, it would nonetheless be a permissible
exercise of state discretion by Schachter's standard. Therefore, discrimina-
tion that may occur under the FTFSA seems to be permissible under
Schachter's view of international economic law.
The temptation to apply the standard of wrongful discrimination to
the FTFSA should not be allayed. However, as this Note concludes, if the
imbalance in asset ownership is not harmful to the United States and, in
any event, is caused by a myriad of factors and not simply discrimination
against U.S. banks, then the FTFSA would seem to serve little or no
useful purpose. Also, the clear target of the FTFSA supporters is Japan,
while banks of other nations, British banks89 for example, seem to attract
less attention. Finally, recent history of relations between the United
States and Japan is replete with tensions in everything from automobile
trade to ownership of baseball teams.' Thus, there seems to be at least
the colorable argument that the FTFSA is motivated by racial animus,
making it the type of unreasonable discrimination Schachter deems to be
6 Id. at 316-17. Schachter suggests that this view is accepted by nearly all states
permitting foreign business on their territory. Id. at 317.
' See George S. Zavvos, Banking Integration and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy
Implications, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 463, 468-69 (1990) (noting the E.C.'s difficulty in
harmonizing banking regulations due to the industry's critical role in the members' na-
tional economies and their sovereignty, as reflected in such issues as monetary and
credit policies).
For a brief history of the political and economic policy justifications of U.S. bank
regulation, see First Nat'l Bank of Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S.
2522, 256-61 (1966).
See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra note 371 and accompanying text.
'o See, e.g., Larry Tye, Major Players in Home Games; Japan's Clout in U.S.
Sports Next: The Controversy over Nintendo's Bid to Buy the Mariners, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 8, 1992, at 49 (controversy over Japanese entrepreneur's efforts to buy
the financially ailing Seattle Mariners baseball team); Paula Stem and Paul A. London,
Deficits in Trade and Leadership, WASH. Q., Autumn 1990, at 105; "Japan Bashing"
Appears to Intensify in California Officials Cite LA. "Buy American" Furor, Graffiti,
Name-Calling, as Signs of Alarming Trend, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1992, at A19.
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wrongful under international law. Although an in-depth sociological and
historical analysis of the racial aspect of U.S. policy and its application
to the FTFSA is beyond the scope of this Note, they do raise important
concerns regarding both the actual motivations of U.S. policy and how
that policy may be perceived in the international arena.
2. GATT Undermined
The FTFSA represents a bilateral approach to trade issues in contra-
vention of the U.S. historic preference for multilateral agreements. A
prime objective of post-World War I U.S. trade policy was to eliminate
the protectionism of the U.S. depression-era policies that increased U.S.
tariffs and instigated the creation of special trading relationships, to the
exclusion of the United States, among the nations of the British Common-
wealth.9 The U.S. preference for multilateralism was realized with the
creation of, and membership in, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT),' which was designed to insure that protectionism and
spiraling tariffs and barriers did not hamper world trade. With U.S.
leadership for over forty years, the GATT has successfully reduced tariffs
on goods" and is generally considered to have facilitated the modem
international trading system and has greatly contributed to modem eco-
nomic prosperity.94
Several guiding principles, sometimes called the "theology" of
GATT, 95 represent its primary legal obligations. The principle of "first-
difference reciprocity" forbids member governments from threatening to
raise tariffs, even if such a threat might force another government to
lower its tariffs.' The "most-favored nation" (MFN) tenet establishes
9' JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT 251 (1969)
[hereinafter WORLD TRADE]. Depression-era trade policy mistakes are also viewed as a
cause of World War II. SIDNEY GOLT, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 1986-90: ORIGINS,
IssuEs & PROsPEcrTvE 2 (1988).
' As originally planned, the new system would be composed of the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International Trade Organization (ITO). Clive
Cook, Nothing To Lose But Its Chains; The ITO That Never Was, ECONOMIST, Sept.
22, 1990, at 7 [hereinafter Cook-i]. The ITO was to have power to effect economic
development, employment policy, and commercial policy. Id. The ITO, however, was
still-born, threatening too much national sovereignty and independent action, and in its
place, the GAT was created to limit protectionism. Id.
93 Clive Cook, Nothing to Lose But Its Chains; Jousting for Advantage, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 22, 1990, at 5 [hereinafter Cook-2].
9 Id.
95 WORLD TRADE, supra note 91, at 194.
' Cook-l, supra note 92. The "central obligation of GATIT" is tariff concessions
4191995]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
that, from the perspective of a single country, no foreign trading partner
is given less favorable tariff rates than those given to its most favored
trading partner.' Another concept, "transparency," encourages nations
that are unwilling to eliminate all trade barriers to convert non-tariff
barriers (quotas, unreasonable standards, etc.) into tariffs." Tariffs are
believed to do less economic harm and are more easily measured impedi-
ments to free trade." Finally, the "national treatment" principle requires
that imported goods will be treated in the same manner as domestically
produced goods with regard to government actions, such as taxes or
regulation; that is, once a good is in the country, it will be subject to no
more regulation than the equivalent domestically manufactured good."°
In practice, these principles act as follows: a nation seeking to foster
entry of its exports to a trading partner is forbidden from threatening to
raise tariffs in order to force tariff concessions (first-difference reciproc-
ity). Instead, it may seek a reduction in the partner's tariff rates by
offering, for example, to reduce its own tariffs, whether on the same or
different goods, for the trading partner. It is important to note that the
GATT principles do not require mirror-image tariffs;.' the countries
need not seek an alignment of tariffs, only a lowering of them. Once
tariff concessions are agreed upon between the nation and its partner, the
MFN principle requires the parties to make the new lower tariffs available
to all GATT members."re The payoff is that the membership, in return,
will be obliged to reciprocate in their trade dealings. 3 The GATT
whereby members commit themselves to limit the level of tariffs. TRADING SYSTEM,
supra note 70, at 40.
9' Cook-i, supra note 92. See also WORLD TRADE, supra note 91, at 255.
During the formative period of GATT, the United States considered the MFN
principle to be "absolutely fundamental" and basic to a liberalized trading system. Id.
at 252. See generally GOLT, supra note 91, at 2-5 (stating that MFN is the central
principle of GATT).
98 Cook-i, supra note 92.
9' Id. Countries may protect domestically produced goods, but may do so only by
tariff and not by breaching the principle of national treatment; this insures the strongest
competition among goods by providing merchants "clear knowledge of the trading con-
ditions." GOLT, supra note 91, at 3-4. See generally WORLD TRADE, supra note 91, at
305-27.
"0 Cook-l, supra note 92; WORLD TRADE, supra note 91, at 273-76. Examples of
attempts to evade national treatment include special labeling and packaging of foreign-
made goods, specious health and purity regulations, and taxes placed on goods after
they have entered the country. WORLD TRADE, supra note 91, at 279-93.
Cook-i, supra note 92.
"o WORLD TRADE, supra note 91, at 255-59.
103 Cook-i, supra note 92.
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community, then, enjoys a downward-moving tariff environment. Finally,
these tariff gains cannot be muted by disparate treatment once products
are within an importing country. For example, a special sales tax, beyond
the tariff, cannot be imposed on imported goods that are not also ap-
plicable to domestically produced goods. Thus, GATT harnesses each
nations' liberalization of barriers for the benefit of its multinational
membership.
This GATT approach has worked stunningly well for manufactured
goods, reducing tariffs by over eighty-five percent (from an average forty
percent in 1947 to about five percent today) and spurring a five hundred
percent increase in the volume of trade between 1950 and 1975."°
Unfortunately, GATT has traditionally applied to products and not servic-
es, although recent efforts have been aimed at including services within
GATT's umbrella.' The most recent "round"'" of GAT negotia-
tions, the "Uruguay Round," despite the attempt, has failed to bring bank-
ing services within GATT" and, for the time being, banking has not
been included in the multilateral GATT trading regime."8
However, the multilateral, and successful approach enshrined in
GATT is clearly undermined by FTFSA.' It ignores the principle of
"o4 Id. Countries accounting for 80% of the world's trade subscribe to GATT. GOLT,
supra note 91, at 2.
105 TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 70, at 42-44.
" GATT has been periodically updated in negotiations referred to as "rounds." See
generally id. at 52-57.
"o Efforts to bring services within GAT began with the Tokyo Round (1973-79).
Mary E. Footer, GA7T and the Multilateral Regulation of Banking Services, 27 INT'L
LAW. 343, 347 (1993).
The failure to include banking services within the Uruguay Round has been cited
as a reason for the Clinton administration's support of the FTFSA; the administration
hopes to be seen as being active in the banking arena. James R. Kraus, Clinton Hopes
to Repair GAYT Deal's Omission of Banking, AM. BANKER, Dec. 16, 1993, at 5.
"0 Even if GATT were applicable to banking services, the FTFSA would not con-
travene it: no determination of discrimination may be made to the extent that it is
inconsistent with bilateral or multilateral agreements involving financial services that
have been approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives before pas-
sage of FTFSA. FTFSA, supra note 21, § 18(d)(2).
"o But U.S. commitment to multilateralism has been weakening. There is a growing
belief that free trade "is for suckers." Cook-2, supra note 93. Moreover, the world is
breaking into trading blocks - Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific. Id. See also
Bruce Stokes, Apres GATT, le Deluge, NAT'L J., Jan. 12, 1991, at 75.
Furthermore, during the 1980s, there was a trend by the United States and E.C.
toward bilateral restrictions on trade - for example, voluntary export restrictions on
automobiles. GOLT, supra note 91, at 11. Thus, the atmosphere leading up to the
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first-difference reciprocity by threatening Japan with sanctions if it does
not lower its barriers to U.S. banks. Rather, the FTFSA uses threats and,
if necessary, punishment to achieve the goal of increased U.S. banking
opportunities abroad. It invites retaliation10 and, like all retaliation-based
approaches in the international arena, it is "dangerous and uncontrolla-
ble."'' Moreover, the FTFSA seeks broader opportunities for U.S. banks
by forcing concessions from other nations on a bilateral basis, rather than
in a way that benefits the entire multilateral community. The FTFSA thus
jettisons the cooperative spirit of first-difference reciprocity and proceeds
down a bilateral path in contravention to the MFN. FTFSA could, then,
lead to the trap, spiraling trade protectionism, that GATT principles were
designed to prevent.
Furthermore, in two significant ways the FTFSA impairs the prolifer-
ation of the legal principles of GATT. First, the FrFSA, as the antithesis
of GATT, is out of step with efforts to include services within the GATT
and thereby undermines the ability of the United States to maintain its
leadership role in the liberalization of trade in financial services."'
Second, and perhaps more troublesome, the FrFSA seems to represent a
movement away from cooperative multilateralism; in short, it may com-
municate to the world the notion that "GATT principles are up for
grabs," a notion that could "haunt" the United States in future trade
negotiations."' In the Uruguay Round, for example, the E.C. wanted
exemptions from GATT for trade in film and television programming and,
yet, the United States "piously [insisted] that GAT principles must be
initiation of the Uruguay Round was marked by
a nagging feeling that there was little point . . . in a formal Round to discuss strength-
ening and extending the GATT in new areas, such as services, when the troubles arose
from the clear unwillingness, or inability, of the major countries to live up to their
professed attachment to liberal trade and to abide by existing rules of the GAIT in the
areas to which it already applied.
Id. at 12.
"1o Japanese law provides national treatment on a reciprocal basis. See infra notes
169-76 and accompanying text. Japan has, moreover, been willing to exercise its
reciprocity requirements; Mexican and Iranian banks have been prevented from estab-
lishing Japanese branches because those nations do not permit entry by Japanese banks.
Fair Trade In Financial Services Legislation, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy, Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 259 (1992) [hereinafter
Part Two] (written answers to questions posed to Professor Hideki Kanda).
" BILL EMMOTr, THE SuN ALSO SaTs 151 (1989).
..2 Industrial countries desired the Uruguay round to extend GATr principles into
new areas, especially services. GOLT, supra note 91, at 14.
",3 Invisible Yearnings, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1993, at 82.
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upheld.""..4 There is more to fear, therefore, from FTFSA than Japanese
retaliation in banking; the effect on U.S. leadership in issues of free trade
generally and the dilution of GATT principles serve to frustrate the
international trading regime credited with world economic prosperity.
3. Alternative Solution: Mutual Recognition
In stark contrast to the retaliatory approach for opening markets
found in the FTFSA is the E.C. Second Banking Directive (Directive)."5
The aim of the Directive was to forge a single European banking market
out of the E.C. members' widely differing financial organization without
barriers to the flow of banks and banking services." 6 Rather than take
the politically difficult route of requiring formal restructuring and align-
ment of each member's financial structure, the Directive's solution is one
of "prudential supervision."" 7 Its basic premise is that a bank operating
in a foreign country (the host country) will be regulated according to the
laws of its home country and supervised by the authorities of its home
country."' Additionally, a license to operate a bank in the home country
serves as a license to establish branches and offer services (within spec-
ified limits)"9 in another E.C. country without further licensing by the
host country (the "single license" principle).' Thus, the E.C. has cho-
sen to go beyond the principle of national treatment with the more liberal
concept of "mutual recognition.'
121
In operation, this approach may mean that foreign banks could offer
services not permitted for banks native to the host country." However,
when a nation discovers that its native banks are at a competitive disad-
114 Id.
.. Council Directive 89/646, 1989 OJ. (L 386) 1.
116 Michael Gruson, The New Banking Law of the European Economic Community,
25 INT'L LAW. 1 (1991).
11 Zavvos, supra note 87, at 502.
... Gruson, supra note 116, at 2.
2.9 Acceptable activities include acceptance of deposits, lending, and portfolio man-
agement. See id. at 6.
'2 Id. at 3.
Institutions seeking to participate in this single license opportunity will have to
meet certain E.C.-wide minimum standards, such as standards on capital adequacy and
availability of information on bank shareholder identities. See Zavvos, supra note 87,
at 487-91.
Host states will still supervise bank or branch liquidity, adherence to monetary
policy, and market risk of securities. Id. at 475.
121 Gruson, supra note 116, at 3-4.
" Zavvos, supra note 87, at 473.
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vantage relative to banks of other nations due to regulatory differences,
it will bring its regulation into alignment." The Directive creates, in
effect, a single E.C. banking market and incentives for harmonization of
laws.
For banks based outside of the E.C. that have not previously estab-
lished European operations or which do not desire to set up European
subsidiaries, the principal of reciprocity is applied.'24 However, fears that
the Directive would create a protectionist "fortress Europe" have been
significantly allayed"z and "on balance... [the Directive] represents
a... substantial step toward international free trade in services.'
The Second Banking Directive offers an alternative model to both
GATT and the FTFSA. It specifies as its objective the attainment of
national treatment for U.S. banks'27 and the opening of international
markets to banking services. As will be shown," much of the responsi-
bility for the U.S.-Japanese banking imbalance must be placed on U.S.
regulatory burdens and the very different financial structures of each
nation. Thus, a Second Banking Directive approach may offer one
solution for alleviating regulatory barriers to banking. Unfortunately, such
an approach would not possess a great chance of success in the current
political climate. In the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion regarding
Japanese banking asset ownership that fuels the FTFSA, it seems highly
improbable that an approach of "mutual recognition" would be politically
palatable.129
' Id. at 484. The goal is to thereby foster the creation of "universal banking"
throughout the entire E.C.. Id. at 480-81. "Universal banking" permits a bank to
conduct both usual banking services and securities services within one corporate entity.
Id. at 480 n.92.
124 Gruson, supra note 116, at 17.
However, "mirror image" reciprocity (i.e., the identical fmancial structure) is not
required; rather it demands, at the least, de jure national treatment and perhaps de facto
effective market access. Thus, there may be the risk that the Directive will thereby re-
quire non-E.C. members to give E.C. banks better treatment than native banks. See
Zavvos, supra note 87, at 496-97.
1'2 Michael J. Levitin, The Treatment of U.S. Financial Services Firms in Post-1992
Europe, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 507, 507 (1990).
126 Id.
' FTFSA, supra note 21, § 18(a).
2 See infra Section IV.
,29 See generally Thomas L. Friedman, Trade War Isn't So Swell Either, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at 4 (satirizing the war-like rhetoric of U.S.-Japan trade); Risking
A Trade War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1994, at 22 ("Polls show Americans favor a tough
stance toward the Japanese."); Thomas L. Friedman, President Revives Tough Trade
Step to Pressure Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at 1; James Sterngold, Hint of U.S.
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IV. DISCRIMINATION AND REGULATION
The FrFSA is premised on the notion that protectionist trade regula-
tion has caused the imbalance in banking asset ownership. This Section
tests this contention by exploring the impact of regulation of bank
expansion in both the Japanese and U.S. systems.
A. The Japanese Regulatory Environment
U.S. banks that wish to establish operations in Japan face several
challenges. The first is to learn the peculiar Japanese style of regula-
tion.' The second is to compete in the structurally complex and com-
partmentalized banking market with its large and entrenched banking enti-
ties.'3 ' The following discussion of the Japanese regulatory and banking
environments illuminate the nature of the challenges facing banks seeking
entry into Japan.
1. The Role of Regulators
(a) Ministry of Finance
While the outlines of Japanese banking are created by statute, the
administrative power lies with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the
Bank of Japan (BOJ)."' The MOF is one of the most respected bureau-
Trade Escalation Draws Warning From Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1994, at D1
(Japan's Prime Minister warns President Clinton against trade sanctions against Japan);
Bamaby J. Feder, Business Chiefs Praise Clinton for Stand on Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 1994, at DI (explaining that President Clinton's tough stance against the Japanese
on trade gains support of important business figures).
," See generally Part Two, supra note 110, at 2, 75-79 (prepared remarks of
Professor Kanda).
13t Id.
32 FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATIONS OF JAPAN, THE BANKING SYSTEM IN
JAPAN 37 (1989) [hereinafter BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN]. For an overview of
significant banking laws in Japan, see id. at 38-54.
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cracies in Japan'33  and one of the most powerful. 34 It is the
government's main supervisory agent over banks. 3
The key tool employed by the MOF in regulating banking is the
power of "administrative guidance," which allows the agency to interpret
laws and issue regulations for which compliance is, in theory, volun-
tary. ' Administrative guidance, which is a common tool among Japa-
nese government agencies, is a request by an agency, acting within its
regulatory purview, that private parties cooperate in obtaining certain
objectives by taking, or refraining from taking, certain actions.'37 Such
guidance is sometimes authorized by law,' but such power also exists
without regard to specific statutory grants. 9 Regardless of its legislative
basis, there is no legal requirement that such guidance be followed.Y
In practice, however, the effect is "compulsory.''.
,3 "MOF men are some of the world's most incorruptible and indefatigable civil
servants. They are bureaucrat's bureaucrats; accountant's accountants. Their ministry pre-
dates most of the rest of the Japanese government, and it is considered the most presti-
gious career track in government." DANIEL BURSTEIN, YEN! 197-98 (1988) [hereinafter
YEN!]. See also R. Taggart Murphy, Power Without Purpose: The Crisis of Japan's
Global Financial Dominance, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 71, 74 ("The
quality of Japan's financial regulators is unsurpassed; they are recruited from the top
ranks of the best universities, and they average decades of training and experience.").
'34 YEN!, supra note 133, at 197-98. See also EMMOTr, supra note 111, at 88.
,3 RicHARD DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 113 (1986)
[hereinafter DALE-l]. The MOF is quite aggressive in monitoring banks and is charac-
terized by a "distinctive ...willingness to intervene informally in situations where
market forces conflict with official policy objectives." Richard Dale, Japan's Banking
Regulations: Current Policy Issues, JAPANESE FINANCIAL GROWTH 33, 33 (Charles A.E.
Goodhart and George Sutija eds., 1990) [hereinafter Dale-2].
'36 KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: PEOPLE AND POWER
IN A STATELESS NATION 343, 344 (1989) (arguing that "administrative guidance" leaves
bureaucracies in positions of great power and enables enforcement by intimidation).
137 Mitsou Matsushita, The Legal Framework of Trade and Investment in Japan, 27
HARV. INT'L L.J. 361, 376 (1986).
13 That is, agencies may have statutory authority to make suggestions, recommenda-
tions, or issue warnings. Id. at 376-77.
139 Id.
'" Id. at 376 ("administrative guidance per se is not governmental compulsion," but
it "substitutes for legal compulsion.")
... WOLFEREN, supra note 136, at 344. The power to interpret laws and issue regu-
lations is, in the Japanese system, coercive, giving bureaucrats great leverage in
enforcing their regulations; so companies "all abide by [administrative guidance] simply
because they want to continue to function." Id.
Professor Matsushita maintains, however, that administrative guidance is not "sacro-
sanct"; rather, its effectiveness relies on several factors: consensus within the industry
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Several factors help illuminate the compulsory effect of mere re-
quests. First, it has been suggested that within the Japanese business
person's psyche is the belief that government requests are to be respected,
and confrontation avoided, even if such requests are wrongful. 42 Sec-
ond, there is a potent pragmatic reason for compliance: agencies have
broad real authority and powers that lend weight to their requests. Thus,
"faced with . . administrative guidance, most companies will think twice
before resisting it."'43 Administrative guidance has been criticized as a
"regulatory system lacking transparency, in which rules and regulations
are clear only to insiders, in which changes in procedures and policy are
not accessible in a timely fashion; and in which foreign firms are fre-
quently left out of the consultative process."'" The relative absence of
clearly written rules ensures "the bureaucracy monumental power to
interpret the law as it deems fit, which includes the ability to intimidate
foreign financial firms."'4" In comparison, the U.S. reliance on explicitly
expressed laws and legal rulings is said to allow outsiders greater ease of
understanding the regulatory environment."4
Among the MOF's formal authority is the power to insist on reports
and perform on-premises examinations of banks. 47 Also, the MOF has
the authority to penalize "misconduct" by suspending bank operations,
rescinding licenses to operate, and ordering banks to keep assets in Japan.
for obtaining the objectives sought by the issuing agency; legislative empowerment of
the agency that would, if employed, achieve the goals of the guidance with the
compulsion of law; and, finally, incentives offered by the government, such as subsi-
dies, for adhering to the guidance. Matsushita, supra note 137, at 377.
A 1982 banking law attempted to shift "emphasis away from administrative guid-
ance towards a more formal regulatory scheme. However ... the [MOF] retains
considerable discretionary powers.... Furthermore, informal guidance continues to be
given outside the new legal framework." DALE-l, supra note 135, at 113.
" Matsushita, supra note 137, at 376-77.
'43 Id. at 377.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 15 (testimony of Senator Jake Gan).
" Joint Hearing, supra note 55, at 133 (prepared text of Eric W. Hayden).
,46 THOMAS F. CARGILL & SHOICHI ROYAMA, THE TRANSITION OF FINANCE IN
JAPAN AND THE U.S.: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVE 54-55 (1988) (stating that an "out-
sider has much less trouble defining the regulatory parameters of the U.S. system than
those of Japan.").
147 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 47.
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(b) The Bank of Japan
The BOJ is a quasi-private institution'" that acts as Japan's central
bank and is charged with the duty of issuing currency, regulating money
supply and money markets, and insuring that the financial system runs
smoothly. 49 The essential functions of the BOJ are acting as a bank's
bank,'50 acting as the government's bank, and implementing monetary
and credit control policies.'' Another important function is issuing
"guidance" on bank lending (sometimes called "window guidance").'
From its daily contact with Japanese financial institutions, the BOJ
monitors lending activity by institutions and keeps such activity "within
limits that the [BOJ] feels to be appropriate."'5 Other important powers
include the setting, together with the MOF, of banks' reserve require-
ments.
5 4
The government has broad control over the BOJ and the MOF has
general supervisory powers over it.' The BOJ is run by a Policy Board
that includes representatives of the MOF, other government agencies, and
private-sector bank and industry representatives. 6 The government and
the BOJ are in close contact and regularly cooperate.'57 There is "no
pretense that the BOJ is independent of the MOF or of general gov-
ernment policy," unlike, for example, the Federal Reserve in the U.S.,
which "goes to great lengths to give an official appearance of indepen-
dence from the Treasury and from the administration and Congress.' 58
2. Regulation Effecting Foreign Bank Entry Into Japan
The central law governing banking in Japan is the "Banking Law,"
initially created in the 1920s.5 9 The Banking Law is "supplemented" by
"4 The government owns 55% of the stock. Id. at 20.
149 Id.
"5 Handling account transactions, lending, and funds transfers among financial in-
stitutions. Id.
151 Id.
52 INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, THE BANK OF JAPAN, THE
JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 325 (Suzuki ed., 1989) [hereinafter Suzuki].
,13 Id. at 325.
,54 Id. at 313.
"5 Id. at 314. The MOF also has the power to appoint and dismiss members of the
policy board. Id.
1"6 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 20.
,51 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 314.
158 CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 146, at 61-62.
,5' BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 38. Banking Law, Law No. 59
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ordinances promulgated by administrative bodies and needs no legislative
imprimatur." In addition, the MOF uses "circulars" to explain laws and
ordinances and provide guidance for their application. 6'
All banks, domestic and foreign, must be licensed by the MOF.' 2
In order to obtain a license, the prospective bank must have capital of
one billion yen;'63 must have reputable and competent management;'
must fulfill an economic need;'65 not be "detrimental to the existing or-
der;,'6 and must meet any other requirements the MOF may consider
necessary for the public interest. Bank mergers and purchases also require
MOF approval. 67 Although more deferential toward banks' independent
decisions than in the years following 1945, MOF approval, in the form of
administrative guidance, is required for establishing branch locations and
their physical aspects, such as size and structure.
68
With regard to entry into Japan by foreign banks, Japan provides
"national treatment" for banks whose home nation provides Japanese
banks the same courtesy (i.e., reciprocal national treatment).69
"[F]oreign banks have the same legal position as Japanese ... banks and
are considered to be banks according to the Banking Law."'70
De jure national treatment of U.S. banks is a recent phenomenon.
For example, foreign firms were first permitted to operate trust banks
beginning in 1985.' In fact, Japan's deregulation of its financial mar-
of 1981, as amended.
s" Id. at 39. Ordinances come in two varieties, cabinet and ministerial. Cabinet ordi-
nances are used to enforce laws and ministerial ordinances are used by ministers to en-
force laws in their particular jurisdictional realm. Id.
161 Id.
62 Article 4 of the Banking Law. Id. at 40. See also DALE-l, supra note 135, at
113.
"6 Article 5 of the Banking Law established the minimum one billion yen figure,
but allows the government, by cabinet ordinance, to raise this figure. BANKING SYSTEM
IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 41-42.
'6 DALE-i, supra note 135, at 113. This requirement is also characterized as "ad-
equate social credibility." BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 40.
" DALE-l, supra note 135, at 113.
36 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 40.
,67 Article 30 of the Banking Law. Id.
6 Id. at 42.
369 Id. at 5-6. Reciprocity is a tool to promote the internationalization of Japanese
banks and concluding that "[n]aturally, this means that Japanese banks have to operate
in an extremely competitive environment both at home and overseas, but this will not
deter them from trying to establish a position in international finance." Id.
' Suzuki, supra note 152, at 196.
,7, PETER S. RoSE, JAPANESE BANKING AND INvESTMENT IN THE U.S.: AN As-
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kets, which had been strictly controlled since World War II, began in
earnest in the late 1970s." Reforms include the liberalization of the
international trading of the yen and yen-denominated financial
instruments, 173 creation of the first certificates of deposit (CDs)," and
the ability of investors to buy foreign commercial paper."5 Also, interest
rate controls were relaxed. In the mid-1980s, ten percent of Japanese bank
deposits paid market rates; by 1990, that figure had risen to fifty-five
percent. 6
Despite reforms and de jure national treatment, foreign banks have
found it difficult to gain market share in Japan.7 For example, interest
rate controls and restrictions on branching tend to benefit established
banks with established branch networks and deposits (of course, such
banks are native). 78 Foreign banks, without the benefit of a large depos-
it and lending base also find themselves at a disadvantage (as do all
private banks in Japan) when faced with competition from the govern-
ment-run Postal Savings System (PSS). 179 Thus, while Japan's deregula-
tion of its financial markets has resulted in de jure national treatment for
U.S. banks, serious de facto barriers remain."O
3. Structure of Japan's Banking Market
After World War II, Japanese economic planners recognized the need
to structure banking so as to keep capital within the country and insure
its allocation to industry.'8 ' Their solution was segmentation. Thus,
SESSMENT OF THEIR IMPACT ON U.S. MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 53 (1991).
172 See id. at 51-54.
,13 Id. at 52.
174 Id.
,75 Id. at 53.
76 Carla Rapoport, Tough Times for Japan's Banks, FORTUNE, July 16, 1990, at 67
[hereinafter Tough Times].
177 ROSE, supra note 171, at 58.
178 Id.
7 Id. See infra Appendix A.
Faced with de jure openness, but severe de facto limitations, bank analyst Eric W.
Hayden suggests that U.S. trade policy focus attention on carving out market niches
wherein U.S. banks have strong competitive advantages, rather than broad accessibility
to the market. Joint Hearing, supra note 55, at 135-36.
" See generally Part Two, supra note 110, at 75-79 (prepared comments of Pro-
fessor Kanda).
"' THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL ON A NEw JAPANESE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM, 1.1.1 (Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan, trans., 1991) [hereinafter
NEW JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM]. See also WOLFEREN, supra note 136, at 121 (stat-
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securities dealings are separated from commercial banking; long-term and
short-term credit institutions are separated; finally, segmentation is further
achieved in specialized banking institutions serving specific industries.'
(a) Ordinary Banks
"Ordinary" banks act as the commercial and savings banks in the
Japanese system.' Ordinary banks fill the role of the financial interme-
diary - taking deposits from corporations and individuals, then convert-
ing deposits into loans or securities,"8 4 and operating as a settlement of
payment system (that is, checking accounts). 85 They are the equivalent
of U.S. commercial banks.
8 6
Ordinary banks are divided into "City Banks" and "Regional Banks,"
and include most foreign-owned banks in Japan. The City Banks, of
which there are twelve, are headquartered in major cities and possess
branch networks that stretch across the nation. 7 These banks head the
lists of the world's largest banks.' The City Banks hold twenty percent
of all Japanese deposits and supply twenty percent of corporate credit.'89
Large corporations are the chief customers for City Banks: corporations
capitalized at one billion yen are responsible for sixty percent of City
Bank deposits and thirty percent of their lending."9 Individuals account
for only ten percent of City Bank lending. 9'
Japan's sixty-four Regional Banks are located in the larger cities of
Japan's forty-seven prefectures." Although permitted to branch nation-
wide, the Regional Banks tend to focus their activities on their home
locality, maintaining close ties with local industries and governments. 93
ing that since the war "banks have been practically the only source of finance for
industry.").
" An example is farming. See infra Appendix A.
113 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 13.
,' As permitted by Securities and Exchange Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 65, as
amended.
"5 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 170.
19 Id.
"s In April 1991, Kyowa and Saitama merged, forming Asahi Bank. World's Largest
Banks, supra note 18, at 115, 118 n.1.
" For a complete list of City Banks see BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note
132, at app. 1, at 1.
"g Id. at 23.
SId.; Suzuki, supra note 152, at 171.
.. Suzuki, supra note 152, at 171.
,92 Id. at 172; BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 23-24.
,93 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 23-24. There are customary, not
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Although generally not as large as City Banks, Regional Banks are still
quite enormous.'94
Foreign banks operating in Japan tend to be ordinary banks.'95 As
of 1988, eighty-one foreign banks were operating in Japan.' Because
of their nature as foreign banks, these institutions tend to be heavily in-
volved in foreign currency transactions, 97 which among Japanese banks
is done only by the Bank of Tokyo.'98
Foreign banks in Japan have not established large branch networks
and, as a result, cannot rely on deposits as the funding source for lending
activities.' Deposits account for only fifty percent of the funds lent,
with money raised on the Eurodollar markets supplying the rest.'
(b) Other Financial Institutions
Japan's banking system is complicated by a number of other special-
ized financial institutions."' Long-Term Credit Banks collect deposits
from governments and public bodies and lend on very long-term time
horizons, notably for such investments as plant and equipment.' The
Japanese system also contains banking institutions that are limited to
serving small and medium-sized customers. For example, "Sogo" banks
may do business only with companies of three hundred employees or
legal, distinctions between City and Regional Banks. Id. For a discussion on the po-
litical power of banks in the prefectures, see Frances Rosenbluth, The Political
Economy of Financial Reform in Japan: The Banking Act of 1982, 6 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 62 , 62-66 (1989).
,'4 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 172. See, e.g., BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra
note 132, at app. 1, at 1 (Bank of Yokohama, a Regional Bank, has greater deposits
than Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, a City Bank); World's Largest Banks, supra note 18,
at 115, 116 (showing that four Japanese Regional Banks are ranked, by assets, as
among the world's largest banks).
'95 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 24.
196 Id.
'97 Id. See also Suzuki, supra note 152, at 197.
9' Suzuki, supra note 152, at 172.
199 Id. at 197-98. "[D]eposits are the most fundamental source of funds for banks,
but foreign banks in Japan have not hitherto expected to attract large deposit bases be-
cause of their small numbers of branches." Id. Moreover, the largest share of deposits
denominated in yen are from non-residents. Id. at 198-99.
2w Id. at 197-99.
"o For a more complete description of the institutions that follow, see infra Appen-
dix A.
" Suzuki, supra note 152, at 202; BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at
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less." 3 Labor Banks, in turn, are restricted to taking deposits from
public bodies and lending, primarily, to labor organizations and their
members."' There are also financial institutions devoted to servicing
certain industries, such as farming and forestry. 5 Complicating this
already complex picture is the PSS.' The PSS is the largest deposit
institution in Japan (holding, in the mid-1980s, thirty percent of all
personal deposits)' and has had several competitive advantages over
other banks, which included, until recently, controlled interest rates and
tax-free status for interest paid to depositors."'
(c) Securities Industry
The U.S. occupying forces instituted the so-called "Article 65"' of
the Japanese Banking Law of 1948 that separated the banking and
securities industries.21° Like the U.S. law upon which Article 65 was
modeled, the Glass-Steagall Act,21' banks are prohibited from dealing in
securities but, unlike the U.S. law, Article 65 "places no controls whatso-
ever on the acquisition of securities and equities for investment purpos-
es."212 As a result, Japanese banks were active buyers in the securities
arena and today control as much as twenty percent of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.213
(d) Summary
Japan's highly compartmentalized financial services industry has
resulted in the creation of very large financial institutions that dominate
the niches in which they operate. U.S. banks seeking to enter a market
203 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 26.
' Suzuki, supra note 152, at 228.
Id. at 235-37.
See infra Appendix A.
EMMOTT, supra note 111, at 101.
2m BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 35.
' Securities and Exchange Law No. 25 of 1948, as amended.
210 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 39. See also Dale-2, supra note 135, at 35 (based on
the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act, Article 65 is "an alien law, imported from the U.S., that
has no basis in Japanese financial policies."); Colin P.A. Jones, Note, Japanese Banking
Reform: A Legal Analysis of Recent Developments, 3 DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 387
(1993).
211 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Dale-2, supra note 135,
at 35.
212 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 39-40. See also Dale-2, supra note 135, at 34.
2,3 Dale-2, supra note 135, at 35.
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such as this encounter the challenges of operating in an unfamiliar
environment and of competing against powerful and entrenched insti-
tutions. This highlights not Japanese protectionism, but the difficulties
U.S. banks must consider in determining the cost-benefit of attempting to
compete in Japan.
B. U.S. Regulations That Injure the Ability of U.S. Banks to Engage in
Foreign Branching
U.S. banks seeking to expand abroad also face challenges from U.S.
government-imposed regulations. The first are direct regulations that
expressly set forth requirements that must be met in order to establish
foreign operations.214 The second are regulations, not directly concerned
with foreign expansion, but which nonetheless impact the bank's financial
strength and ability to compete in foreign markets.215
1. Direct Regulation of Foreign Branching
To establish a foreign branch,2"6 a U.S. banking company must
have $1,000,000 in capital2"7 and apply to the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB).2" The acceptance by the FRB of the
application will entitle the applicant to either establish a branch in a
foreign country or to hold the stock of a bank incorporated under the
laws of a foreign country.219
Foreign branches of U.S. banks are subject to the same lending
limitations as U.S. branches, which is fifteen percent of the banks' capi-
tal.' Thus, for example, a U.S. branch operating in Japan may be at a
competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis a native Japanese bank which is subject
2,4 See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
25 See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
216 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(k) (1993) (defining "foreign branch" as "an office of an
organization. . . that is located outside the country under the laws of which the
organization is established, at which a banking or financing business is conducted.").
See also Marilyn B. Cane & David A. Barclay, Competitive Inequality: American
Banking In the International Arena, 13 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. LAW REv. 273, 278
(1990).
217 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (empowering National Banks to establish branches in
foreign country); 12 C.F.R. § 211.3(a)(1) (1993) (the $1,000,000 is comprised of capital
and surplus).
218 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
219 Id.
- 12 U.S.C. §§ 84(a)(2), 324 (1988).
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to a lending limit of twenty percent of capitalV
The branches of U.S. banks are permitted to "exercise such ...
powers as may be usual in connection with the transaction of the business
of banking in" the foreign country.' However, several limitations are
imposed. First, the branch may not engage in the "general business of
producing, distributing, buying, or selling goods, wares or merchan-
dise."'' Also, the branch may not engage in the business, directly or
indirectly, of underwriting, selling, or distributing securities. 4 This,
however, is subject to an exception allowing the branch to deal in the
securities of the government of the country in which it resides, if the
FRB may "deem it necessary."'
Reserve requirements for foreign branches (of both members and
non-members of the Federal Reserve System)' are statutorily required
to be the same as domestic U.S. branches for deposits owned by the
bank's U.S. offices; loans to U.S. residents made by the foreign branch;
and assets held by foreign offices of a depository institution in the United
States which were acquired from its domestic office.'
Foreign branches are not included in the parent bank's premiums for
deposit insurance and, therefore, are not insured by the FDIC.'
2. Regulation that Indirectly Inhibits Establishment of Foreign
Branches
Regulations on U.S. banks at home limit their growth and profitabili-
ty, having the dual effect of weakening their competitive posture in the
United States relative to strong foreign banks and inhibiting the ability of
U.S. banks to expand abroad. The two most striking of these limitations
are restrictions on the type of business in which banks may engage and
restrictions on the geographic area in which they may operate.
22 Id.
-2 12 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1988).
223 Id.
224 Id.
25 Id.
12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(5) (1988).
12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(5)(A),(B),(C) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 211.3(c) (1993); 12 C.F.R.
§ 204.1(c) (1993).
12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1988).
12 U.S.C. § 1815(a) (Supp. V 1993) permits deposit insurance for "depository institu-
tions." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993) defines depository institution as, inter
alia, "any bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(o) (1988) defines "foreign branch." 12 U.S.C. §
1813(a) (Supp. V 1993) defines "bank," but this definition does not include foreign
branchs.
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(a) Product Limitations
The Glass-Steagall Act 9 - perhaps the most famous U.S. banking
law 30 - prohibits banks from directly or indirectly buying, selling, or
distributing securities."3' Glass-Steagall was enacted in response to the
widespread belief that the Great Depression was, at least in part, caused
when banks and securities dealers were able to commingle their activi-
ties." Hence, the act built a wall between commercial banking and
investment banking. 3 "This statutory bar reflected a decision to impose
direct regulatory controls on the assets and investments of banks, remov-
ing from banks' management the discretion to allocate resources among
business opportunities.""3 4 Also, the "competitive equality doctrine," as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, 5 restricts national banks to only
those banking activities in which states permit their state-chartered banks
12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
o Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation
in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 501, 510 (1989).
"3 However, the wall between activities has blurred, 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15)
(1993) allows holding companies to engage in discount brokerage.
232 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETTITVE BANKS XVIII-6 (1991) [hereinafter
RECOMMENDATIONS]. Congress had several motivating beliefs: it believed that banks
engaged in securities tended to invest in speculative ventures "to the detriment of
overall economic growth and stability." Also, it felt that the separation of investment
and commercial banking activities was required to restore public confidence in the
banking system. Lastly, investigations revealed significant "questionable activities," such
as failure to disclose information regarding securities holdings and lending money to
customers to finance security purchases. Id. But cf. John P. Laware, U.S. Banking
System Must Diversify, AM. BANKER, Oct. 16, 1990, at 13 (remarking that the "most
prominent of ...discredited [theories on the cases of the Great Depression] is the one
that blamed securities activities of the banks for the market crash of 1929 and the
resultant Depression. That error of judgment lead to the Glass-Steagall Act and the
separation from commercial banking of the brokerage and underwriting of securities.").
233 12 U.S.C. § 377, 78 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Henry N. Butler, The Myth of
Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 677, 696 (1988) (noting
that the separation of such activities did not apply to state non-member banks until
1987).
24' Garten, supra note 230, at 510.
"3 Clark v. Securities Indus. Ass'n., 479 U.S. 388, 409 (1987) (noting that Congress
intended to place national and state banks on a basis of "competitive equality" insofar
as branch banking was concerned); First Nat'l Bank of Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank
& Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1962) (stating that "competitive equality" is required
only in "core" banking functions; hence, a bank's operation of a discount brokerage
subsidiary was not subject to the doctrine.).
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to engage. 36
Another example of product separation is insurance. Nationally
chartered banks are strictly forbidden from selling insurance in areas with
a population greater than five thousand (for areas with lesser population,
the Comptroller of Currency, at its discretion, may permit insurance sales
by banks). 7 Furthermore, the United States requires international banks
with controlling interests in both a U.S. bank and insurance company to
divest either the U.S. bank or the insurance company. 8 In contrast,
E.C. law establishes no barriers between these industries. 9
Despite such restrictions, banks were able to remain very profitable
until recently when new competitive forces eroded banking's traditional
monopoly on financial products. Banks have increasingly competed for
funds with various new competitors - money market mutual funds, for
instance - and, therefore, they have experienced increasing costs of
funding.24 Banks also faced stiffer competition in lending activities
from foreign banks24' and financial markets.242 Also, so-called "non-
bank" lenders provided fierce competition for the middle and smaller-
Butler, supra note 233, at 701.
12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). States, however, have allowed state-
chartered banks to enter the insurance field. California, for instance, in 1989, began
allowing banks to sell, although not underwrite, insurance. Teresa Carson, California
Banks Gear Up to Enter Insurance Field, AM. BANKER, May 12, 1989, at 2.
12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Zavvos, supra note 87, at 500.
24 Garten, supra note 233, at 522-23. Other examples of "franchise erosion" include
the ability in the 1970s of credit unions and thrifts to sell interest-bearing checking ac-
counts (NOW), eliminating a monopoly formerly held by banks. RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 232, at XVfII-10.
241 Garten, supra note 230, at 523. Also, some foreign banks were allowed to retain
their securities operations after 1978 - the year the International Banking Act
subjected branches of foreign banks to the same prohibition on dealing in securities as
U.S. banks. Foreign Banks in America; Concerned about Congress, ECONOIST, Sept.
7, 1991, at 76. Foreign banks with branches in the United States have the advantage
of the use of the parent's full capital. Id. However, foreign-owned subsidiary banks in
the United States must be separately capitalized. Id.
242 "Most notable has been the drastic change in the role of commercial banks as
providers of commercial and industrial . . . loans - the core of the traditional
franchise. Many of the banks' most credit-worthy loan customers. . . now borrow
directly from . . . the commercial paper market at lower rates." RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 232, at XVIII-11. The ratio of commercial and industrial loans to com-
mercial paper outstanding has decreased from 10 in 1960 to 1.2 in 1989. Id. Also,
banks began "securitizing" assets; that is, selling individual loans or a pool of similar
loans (auto loans, for example) and using the loans or pools as backing for the
issuance of securities. Id. at XVIII-12.
4371995]
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
sized borrowers. 243 Banks have faced increasingly potent competition in
their traditional roles as lenders and deposit-takers, but have been prohib-
ited from entering more profitable arenas, such as securities dealing.
2
"
Efforts to maintain profitability led banks to engage in riskier
activities, such as lending for real estate, performing highly leveraged
transactions, and making loans to less-developed countries.245 As dis-
cussed below,24 these limitations may have financially weakened U.S.
banks and hindered their ability to expand overseas. Moreover, it is
instructive to note that the E.C. views product limitation as the "first and
most important obstacle to liberalization and harmonization of global
finance."247
(b) Geographic Restrictions
Another striking feature of the U.S. banking system is that a bank's
ability to grow by branching has historically been limited to the state,
county, city, or even building where it was created. Such geographic
restrictions cannot be found in Japan, Germany, or Canada.2"
The Depression-era McFadden Act (as amended) allows nationally
chartered banks to branch interstate with the approval of the Comptroller
of the Currency and with the explicit permission of the state to which the
bank is branching.249 Similarly, the passage of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956 (BHCA) empowered banks to set up Bank Holding
Companies and purchase banks in other states, running them as wholly
243 Garten, supra note 230, at 525.
24 Id. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, advocated the repeal
of Glass-Steagall in order to allow banks to respond to changes in the financial markets
in the United States and abroad. Nathanial C. Nash, Let Banks Enter Securities Field,
Greenspan Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1987, at Al.
245 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at XVIII-6.
246 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
247 Zavvos, supra note 87, at 498-99.
24 Eric N. Berg, Many Bankers Upset by Talk of "Superbanks," N.Y. TIMEs, June
10, 1987, at Dl.
249 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(1) (1988). See generally First Nat'l Bank of Logan, Utah v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 256-60 (1966). Since the founding of the
nation there has been a bias against branching, reflecting the fear that capital would be
concentrated into the hands of a few large banks with a wide geographic reach. This
fear was still evident with the McFadden Act, which addressed the growing disparity
between National Banks, which were not permitted to branch, with State Banks, which
were increasingly gaining branching rights. The McFadden Act's solution was to allow
National Banks to branch, but only to the extent that State banks were so permitted.
(Vol. 27:407
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owned subsidiaries.250 Even this attempt at liberalizing geographic re-
strictions was limited by the Douglass Amendment to the BHCA, which
forbids an interstate acquisition by Bank Holding Companies unless the
target bank's home state allows their purchase and ownership"1
States, subject to political pressure from local banks 2 and eager to
maintain their bank monopolies, were slow to allow interstate bank-
ing.25 3 In fact, in 1990 only thirty-nine states allowed branching state-
wide within even their own territory and two states prohibited branching
altogether5 4 The U.S. banking market remains very segmented with
over 12,000 banks (not including thrifts).255
This reluctance to allow interstate banking is ironic considering the
advantages such banking would provide. First, it has been shown that
interstate banking improves banks' profit margins. The pretax profit
margin of banks based in states that allow interstate banking are twelve
percent greater than banks located in states without interstate banking.256
Furthermore, geographic limitations injure bank soundness,257 efficien-
- 12 U.S.C. § 1841-1847 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Most interstate banking laws
prohibit expansion by the de novo creation of a new subsidiary. RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 232, at XVII-2.
251 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at XVII-2.
22 Id. at XVII-6.
"3 In 1975, Maine became the first state to allow interstate banking. Id. at XVII-8.
In 1982, New England allowed reciprocal interstate banking on a regional basis. Id. It
was not until 1985 that the Supreme Court held that such interstate banking was legal
in the United States. Id.
During the 1980s interstate banking was slowed by opposition from then Chairman
of The Federal Reserve, Paul Volker, who maintained that the decentralized system best
assured competitiveness. Nathaniel C. Nash, Treasury Now Favors Creation of Huge
Banks, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1987, at 1. See generally Tom Shahnazarian, Jr., Sad Saga:
Colorado's Late, Great Banks, COLO. Bus. MAG., June 1993, at 58 (discussing the
impact of Colorado's refusal to allow banks to branch until 1991).
24 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at XV1I-7 - XVII-8.
2S Figure as of 1990. Id. at XVII-16. If the United States had the same con-
centration of banks per capita as Canada, which has a nationwide branching system, the
United States would have only 75 banks. Id. at XVII-17.
25 Mary S. Schranz, Takeovers Improve Firm Performance: Evidence from the Bank-
ing Industry, 101 J. POL. ECON. 299, 321 (1993).
1 Bank soundness is injured by limiting diversification of geographic risks. RECOM-
MENDATIONS, supra note 232, at XVII-8 - XVII-9. Nationwide branching would provide
a "more diversified and stable base of depositors as well as a broader base of con-
sumer and corporate borrowers" that in turn would help prevent situations like the
banking disaster in Texas, infra Section V.F, in which a depressed regional economy
severely injured local banks. Nash, supra note 253, at 1.
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cy, 2 8 and, significantly, size. Size is crucial to U.S. banks' competitive-
ness in the world market and is especially critical in improving their
ability to compete with Japanese and German banks. 9 It is believed
that to be "world-class," competitive with foreign banks, a very large U.S.
base is required.'
Limitation in size and profitability, as geographic restrictions are,
hampers a bank's ability to compete for capital and acquisitions."
"Most bankers and bank regulators recognize that capital is king in
today's banking environment." 2 Capital serves several valuable purpos-
es: it provides a cushion for credit losses; helps maintain public confi-
dence in the solvency of the financial institution; protects investors in
case of credit losses and liquidation; permits banks, as an indicator of
bank financial strength, to more cheaply raise capital in the stock market;
and, importantly, it enables a bank to gain "competitive entry by acquir-
ing the necessary infrastructure to operate." 3 Hence, one solution for
increasing U.S. bank capital is the consolidation of geographically dis-
persed banks, making the large financial institutions "better equipped to
compete globally with the banking giants of Japan, Germany, France, and
England."
It is instructive to note one last point with regard to restrictions on
interstate banking. Finding it "alarming" that U.S. laws permit discrimina-
tion against banks of "sister states," the E.C. regards such restrictions as
a trade barrier and a denial of national treatment.2
" The duplication of branches, support functions, computer systems, and the limita-
tion on economies of scale. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at XVII-10 - XVII-11.
Berg, supra note 248, at Dl.
Nash, supra note 253, at 1. Another advantage is the ability to perform large
transactions. Id.
261 Id.
262 Timothy W. Koch, The Emerging Bank Structure of the 1990's, Bus. ECON., July
1992, at 32. Capital reduces bank risks in three ways: first, it is the "cushion" that
absorbs losses; second, it produces high capital levels, a sign of strength in banking,
allowing banks to more easily access money via the stock and bond markets at a low
price; and third, high levels of capital restricts available funds to be lent out, which,
restrains risk-taking. Id.
' Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International Capital Adequacy Standards:
Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 189, 190-92
(1992) (quoting the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency). See also Koch, supra note 262.
' Koch, supra note 262.
265 See Zavvos, supra note 87, at 499. Generally, the European nations have a
single, primary regulator. SARKIS J. KHOURY, THE DEREGULATION OF THE WORLD
FiNANCIAL MARKETS: MYTHs, REALITES AND IMPACt 53 (1990). But cf. Gruson,
supra note 116, at 21 (arguing that interstate limitations apply equally to U.S.-based
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C. Summary
While U.S. bank entry into Japan was formerly severely limited by
direct regulation, this is no longer true. Now, U.S. banking institutions
suffer from the same regulatory burdens placed on their Japanese counter-
parts and are subject to no more direct regulatory disadvantages than
those competitors.' Japanese "national treatment" of U.S. banks is,
however, conditional. The Japanese Banking Law makes it clear that such
treatment in Japan is based on reciprocity. The FTFSA is retaliatory and,
if implemented, would justify the Japanese in recision of national treat-
ment - the exact opposite reaction envisioned by the FTFSA supporters.
More importantly, it is dangerous to misplace the blame for the
imbalance. A significant amount of responsibility for the slow expansion
of U.S. banks into Japan, and their weakened position at home when
competing with the increased Japanese presence, must be placed on our
own regulatory choices. Direct restrictions, while perhaps relatively minor,
are nonetheless barriers to overseas expansion. More importantly, regula-
tions imposed on U.S. banks in response to the Great Depression are still
at work limiting the ability of U.S. banks to gain capital, profitability,
and size.
V. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE ASSET OWNERSHIP
IMBALANCE
Regulatory barriers alone do not explain the imbalance of banking
asset ownership. To evaluate the effectiveness of the FrFSA, which
contemplates unfair trade practices as the cause of asset ownership
imbalance, other possible causes of the imbalance should be explored.
Towards that purpose, this Section presents several forces that may have
contributed to the current imbalance in asset ownership.
A. Twin Deficits
The U.S. budget deficit ballooned during the 1980s, quintupling to
four trillion dollars.6 7 Simultaneously, U.S. consumers consumed more
banks and, hence, the interstate barriers are not a denial of national treatment).
' The chief of Citibank's North Asia Division has been reported as saying,
"[b]arriers? Not a single one that matters. Japan is now one of the most attractive
markets in the world." Carla Rapoport, You Can Make Money In Japan, FORTUNE, Feb.
12, 1990, at 85. But cf. Citicorp's chairman supports the FTFSA, reversing his earlier
position. Citicorp's Reed Now Backs Fair Trade Bill, AM. BANKER, Oct. 27, 1993, at
2.
' Mark Memmott, Getting to the Bottom of Debt, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 1992, at
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than they produced, in an amount over one trillion dollars." s The result
was a borrowing binge by the United States and a lending binge on the
part of the Japanese.269 The Japanese were well-positioned to play such
a role. Japanese families and business people save more than they invest
in their home economy."7 Moreover, Japan experienced net trade sur-
pluses during the 1980s amounting to $360 billion flowing into the coun-
try.271 The deregulating world of the 1980s - where worldwide deregu-
lation of fimance2' meant that "capital [flowed] across national borders
with as little regard for 'sovereign' boundaries as the weather has '  -
allowed these two conditions, the Japanese surplus and the U.S. deficit,
to collide.
The growth of Japanese banks at home and abroad need not be
explained by unfair practices by Japanese banks or the Japanese gov-
ernment:
4B.
260 The sum of yearly trade deficits during 1980 through 1989, was $1042.7 billion,
as reported in the following articles: Oil Widens Trade Gap in Month, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1981, at Dl; Trade Gap Narrowed Last Month, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1982,
at D1; '82 Trade Gap is Record, But December Improved, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1983,
at D13; 1983 Trade Deficit Hit $69.4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1984, at 29; Peter
T. Kilbom, U.S. Trade Deficit Set Record in 1984, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1985, at Al;
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Year's Trade Deficit Hit Record $ 148.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1986, at Dl; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. Trade Deficit in Reversal, Fell 44%
in December, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1987, at 1; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. Trade
Deficit Narrows Further as Export Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1988, at 1; Robert D.
Hershey, Jr., U.S. Trade Deficit Shrinks to $11.9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989,
at A37; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Trade Gap Reaches 5-Year Low, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
1990, at 35.
' See Joint Hearing, supra note 55, at 16-17 (Senator Ted Kennedy lamenting that
the United States is "completely addicted" to debt).
270 Bill Orr, Competing With Japanese Banks, ABA BANKING J., Sept. 1990, at 39.
Households in Japan save, on average, as much as 19% of their annual income, while
U.S. households save less than five percent. Murphy, supra note 133, at 72.
' Orr, supra note 270, at 39.
In the 1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s the United States deregulated
banking in many ways. Id. See, e.g., RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at 1-19. In
1978, deposit interest rates were deregulated and S&L's were authorized to sell six-
month certificates of deposit. Orr, supra note 270, at 39. In 1980, the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act authorized the complete elimination
of deposit interest rate ceilings, by 1986, and allowed banks to offer NOW accounts
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal - interest-paying consumer checking accounts - and,
in 1991, Savings and Loans were authorized to offer adjustable rate mortgages. Orr,
supra note 270, at 39.
2 Orr, supra note 270, at 39.
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there is nothing surprising or even sinister about the strength of Japa-
nese banks .... It is a direct by-product of Japan's successful econo-
my and the fact that, since 1982, Japan has become the world's largest
exporter of capital. For all sorts and nationalities of banks, their business
can crudely be summarized as 'have money, will travel.'274
Further, the increased presence of Japanese banks can be explained
in terms of "following the customer."'275 The combined trade deficit and
budget deficit led to an increased presence in the United States of
Japanese manufacturers and investors. In exchange for Japanese money,
the United States purchased goods from around the world, including
Japan. The Japanese accepted U.S. government securities, stocks, and
bonds,276 and such direct investment as purchases of businesses and real
estate.' Japanese purchases of property, plants, and equipment in Cali-
fornia increased 129% between 1982 and 1986.278 The Japanese banks
have very close ties with their customers," so when Japanese exporters
and investors made their way to the United States, Japanese banks fol-
lowed.'
EMMOTr, supra note 111, at 166-67.
See infra Section V.
'7 Orr, supra note 270, at 39.
Id. Japanese new direct foreign investment jumped from $4.5 billion in 1982 to
$20 billion in 1987, with greater than half going to the United States. EMMOTr, supra
note 111, at 136.
. Orr, supra note 270, at 39. Cost advantages aside, it has been suggested that the
Japanese were eager to invest in the United States to avoid the growing protectionism
in the country. DOUGLAS FRANTZ & CATHERINE COLLINS, SELLING OUT: How WE ARE
LETriNG JAPAN BUY OUR LAND, OUR INDusTRIES, OUR FINANCIAL INSTITUTONS, AND
OUR FUTURE 31 (1989).
r See infra Section V.E.
o "[B]ankers have a reputation as being conservative. They have . . . left the
honour of first entry into hostile foreign territories to others, playing a supportive role
as camp followers. The Japanese expansion abroad has been no exception." Gunter
Dufey, The Role of Japanese Financial Institutions Abroad, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL
GROWTH 132, 144 (Charles A.E. Goodhart & George Sutija eds., 1990) [hereinafter
Dufey]. Also, "[t]he pronounced sense of mutual obligation in Japanese culture" may
have "induced Japanese banks to follow their customers." Id. Japanese banks go to
great lengths to maintain their relationships with their Japanese customers. Id. at 144-
45. This is a "gravitational" explanation of Japanese Bank behavior. Robert Z. Aliber,
Comment, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL GRowTH 166, 167 (Charles A. E. Goodhart &
George Suitja eds., 1990). See also Orr, supra note 270 ("Banks follow trade.");
FRANTZ & COLLINS, supra note 278, at 231.
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B. Cost of Capital
During the 1980s, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) skyrocketed,
surpassing, in 1987, the value of the New York Stock Exchange.s This
directly impacted the bottom line of Japanese banks. As noted 2 Japa-
nese banks held a large percentage of the TSE. Japanese regulation
permitted a large percentage of these holdings to be applied to banks'
capital reserves." Hence, when the TSE rose, correspondingly less cash
needed to be set aside, freeing capital for lending and investment purpos-
es. Moreover, Japanese regulation required a lower level of reserves than
was required by U.S. regulators;s 4 hence, again, the Japanese used less
of their cash resources for capital requirements.ss Simply put, with less
cash sitting idle in reserves, the Japanese banks enjoyed a cost of capital
advantage.
In a worldwide effort to increase the soundness of banks, the Basel
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, made up of
the banking officials of the twelve leading Western economies, recom-
mended" 6 that each nation adopt a minimum capital ratio of eight per-
cent, half of which could include such assets as security holdings and
physical plant. 7 Each country was given great leeway in determining
how to achieve this goal."s The U.S. refused to include premises value,
fixed assets, or securities in its valuation of capital. 9 Japan, however,
2"1 YEN!, supra note 133, at 38. The value of Nippon Telegraph & Telephone on
the stock exchange was greater than the combined sum of IBM, AT&T, General Mo-
tors, General Electric, and Exxon. Id.
See supra Section IV.A.3(c).
Dufey, supra note 280, at 155-58.
Regulatory reserve requirements that exceed actual liquidity needs, while re-
inforcing solvency, act as a form of taxation, increasing the cost of capital. Rosa,
supra note 171, at 158-59.
' A striking example of this impact can be seen by comparing the Japanese City
Banks' capital-asset ratios in 1986 - which ranged in value between 1.75% to 2.99%
- with the largest U.S. banks, which had ratios in the 3.39% to 6.87% range. See
Dufey, supra note 280, 155-58.
28 The standards are not legally enforceable as treaty nor do they impose an
independent legal obligation on the Parties. Alford, supra note 263, at 201. For a
detailed explanation of the calculation for U.S. standards under the Basel agreement, see
id. at 193-96.
' Basel Committee Issues Final Risk-Based Capital Standards, BANKING REP.
(BNA), July 25, 1988, at 135.
28 A Method for Evaluating Interest Rate Risk In U.S. Commercial Banks, 77 FED.
REs. BuLL. 8, 625.
289 Basel Committee Issues Final Risk-Based Capital Standards, BANKING REP.
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permitted its banks to use forty-five percent of the value of their securi-
ties holdings - which, as mentioned above, are quite significant - to-
wards the four percent. Moreover, the eight percent figure represented an
increase for many U.S. banks,2' forcing the banks to increase reserves
during a period of particularly harsh operating conditions.29'
Another effect of the inflated Japanese stock market was the ability
of Japanese banks to raise funds. In 1989, Japan's top banks had a price-
earnings (PE) ratio of 45.7 to 130.8. Top U.S. banks, on the other hand,
had PEs of 6.4 to 7.9.2 Such a differential gives Japanese banks a
"privileged access to low-cost capital."293 All else being equal, an issu-
ance of stock by a Japanese bank would raise five to twenty times the
amount of the issuance of the same amount of stock by a U.S. bank.
"With ludicrously low cost of capital, of course, Japanese banks have an
easier time penetrating foreign markets and repelling foreign banks at
home."'29
The advantages of the 1980s have become Japan's disadvantages of
the 1990s. The TSE, after reaching a high in 1989 fell over forty percent
by 1992. This meant that the Japanese banks that had relied on their TSE
holdings to meet capital standards could no longer meet them.295 More-
over, the necessary capital could not be easily raised, as the TSE collapse
meant that "the days of raising buckets of cheap equity to fuel growth
[were] over."2
C. The Yen
Another reason Japanese banks displaced U.S. banks on the lists of
the world's largest banks has been the great appreciation of the value of
the yen. This has been a factor allowing them to aggressively enter the
U.S. market during the 1980s and is continuing so far in the 1990s. In
November 1982, the yen/dollar ratio was 268.05;2' by November 1990,
it stood at 130.10;298 and in November 1993, the figure was 107.952'
(BNA), July 25, 1988, at 135.
o Dufey, supra note 280, 155-58.
2' See infra Section V.F.
Orr, supra note 270, at 39.
Dale-2, supra note 135, at 43.
Henny Sender, Will the Japanese Soon Own the World?, INsrtrrToNAL INVES-
TOR, Jan. 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAGS File.
See generally Tough Times, supra note 176, at 66.
Id. at 67.
Closing price on November 16, 1982. Dollar at 6-Year High Against Pound,
Gold Up, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1982, at D12.
' Closing price on November 28, 1990. Dollar Up After Comments By Greenspan
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- a doubling in the strength of the yen. Japanese assets stated in dollar
terms, would have doubled as a simple matter of mathematics. In fact,
one researcher has stated "[t]he growth in U.S. dollar assets of leading
Japanese banks is as much due to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-
d-vis the yen as it is due to growth in real assets of leading Japanese
banks."3' Purchase of U.S. assets by Japanese banks, therefore, was
made easier, while, correspondingly, the purchase of Japanese assets by
U.S. banks was more difficult.3"' The exchange rate made U.S. assets
look cheap.
D. Deregulation
Ironically, the very deregulation of the Japanese system that is
constantly being thrust upon the Japanese may have helped spur the rapid
growth of Japanese assets abroad. The Japanese financial system was
designed to meet the post-war severe credit deficit; it worked so well that
by the early 1980s it held a surplus of capital. Therefore, when Japan
instituted financial liberalization in the late 1970s and early 1980s3" the
dam burst and pent-up capital was more free to seek out new oppor-
tunities. 3 The Japanese Federation of Bankers Associations maintains
that "structural limitations of Japan's economy make overseas investment
an attractive prospect. ' 30
4
About Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1990, at D20.
Closing price on November 9, 1993. Dollar Posts Broad Gains While Gold Also
Advances, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993.
' Dufey, supra note 280, at 141. The growth in assets when expressed in current
U.S. dollars on non-U.S. banks can be "decomposed approximately as the sum of" the
following:
1. the growth rate in real assets of foreign banks, expressed in constant units of
the banks' home-country currency;
2. the depreciation rate of the U.S. dollar,
3. the inflation rate in the home country of the bank.
Id. at 140-41.
30' FRANTZ & COLLINS, supra note 278, at 31-32.
3m2 EMMOTT, supra note 111, at 97-98 (permitting, for example, the issuances in
Europe of yen-denominated bonds, making the yen more important as an international
currency).
o Id. at 99. See also ROSE, supra note 171, at 51-54.
3 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 5.
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E. The Japanese Way of Banking
A final way in which the Japanese may have gained competitive
advantage is the way, based on cultural factors, in which they conduct
business.
First, the Japanese are notorious for having long-term investment
horizons." 5 Japanese banks "will tolerate lower profit margins and thus
lower prices than will their banking rivals."3" Lower profit margins
clearly act to discourage firms from entering their home market and this
serves as a Japanese advantage when they enter new markets.
Second, Japan's banks maintain very close relationships with their
large clients. Before World War II, Japanese industry was dominated by
"zaibatsu" corporations which were family-owned conglomerates that
controlled companies in diverse trades, from manufacturing to trading and
fimance." ° After the war, such entities were disbanded by the military
occupiers.3 However, they were reborn in the form of "keiretsus," with
banks, instead of families, at the center."
A keiretsu is, in essence, a group of companies - typically an
insurance company, a trading company, and several manufacturers or
marketing companies, and a single central bank" 0 - that establish a
very close working relationship. In a process called cross-sharing. the
keiretsu member companies purchase sizable portions of each other's
stock (known as "relationship shares"). 2 Although banks are limited to
owning no more than five percent of the securities of another corpora-
tion,3"3 after each member of the keiretsu has purchased the others'
' See also Ely Razin, Are the Keiretsu Anticompetitive? Look to the Law, 18 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 351, 362-63 (1993).
' EMMOTr, supra note 111, at 167. See also ROSE supra note 171, at 55 (noting
that in recent years U.S. banks have experienced a return-on-assets of close to one
percent, while the Japanese have experienced .5% - .6%).
1 CARGILL & RoYAMA, supra note 146, at 45.
3 Id.
3 Id.
310 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks
of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1057 (1992). Typically, the bank is a City
Bank. See CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 146, at 46-47.
" YEN!, supra note 133, at 231.
312 Id. Firms are evaluated on their willingness to hold each other's shares on a long
term basis; it is expected that keiretsu members will hold the shares for the long term.
Id.
... ROSE, supra note 171, at 54 (noting that the restriction has been effective only
since December 1987).
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shares, twenty to thirty percent of each firm's stock is controlled by the
keiretsu. '14 This ownership fosters a strong preference for intra-keiretsu
purchasing of goods and services315 and is clearly a factor of "who does
business with whom.
316
Keiretsu member presidents, acting as a shadow board of directors,
typically meet on a monthly basis.17 The nature of these meetings is
somewhat mysterious, but it likely serves as some combination of a social
and informal decision making function.3" These managerial links pro-
vide closer personal ties as well as cooperation in long-term strategic
planning and operational integration.3 9 Banks, although playing a central
role, are not dictatorial; rather the keiretzu decision making, which
reflects Japanese style, is based on consensus.32
The keiretsus offer banks many advantages, because companies
expect that relationship shares will be held for the long term, banks can
place long-term goals ahead of short-term goals, sacrificing short-term
profits without injuring investor confidence.32' Indeed, it has been re-
ported that the Japanese keiretsu members value long-term stability over
profits;31 in fact, the primary purpose of relationship shares may be the
creation of "intercorporate bonds," not an investment aimed at obtaining
an ownership interest or return on capital. 3' For members generally,
there is reduced business risk due to financial, service, and product
interdependence; low risk members "can borrow from banks and simulta-
neously act as intermediaries to the higher risk member by providing
trade credit." '24 Thus it is clear the banks "play a role far beyond trans-
314 Wilmarth, supra note 310, at 1057. See also Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the U.S., 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1936
(1993) (claiming cross-sharing amounts to 50% of stock).
3, Razin, supra note 305, at 362.
316 YEN!, supra note 133, at 231.
3, Roe, supra note 314, at 1943.
338 Id. at 1943-45.
3,9 Razin, supra note 305, at 361.
32 See Roe, supra note 314, at 1943-45. "Wa" - harmony - profoundly influences
Japanese culture and directly impacts keiretsu practices. Razin, supra note 305, at 361.
32 Wilmarth, supra note 310, at 1063.
322 CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 146, at 46-47.
3' Razin, supra note 305, at 359.
324 CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 146, at 46-47. The benefits of keiretsu include
the following:
- Financing members are given "extensive input" into the borrower's operations,
while borrowers have access to "otherwise unobtainable" funds. Razin, supra note 305,
at 359.
- Relationship shares provide equity financing and closer corporate ties. Id. at 359-
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ferring funds"3" and further illuminates their willingness to "follow their
customers" to the United States.
However, the keiretsus are not as powerful as they may appear. They
are not as powerful as German banks which, in comparison, are allowed
unlimited stock ownership of industrial corporations. 26 They are increas-
ingly under "severe stress" due to market forces and financial liberaliza-
tion in Japan. The large industrial corporations that make up the keiretsu
increasingly have access to international financial markets, modem
financial products (such as securitization of debt), and significant retained
earnings.327 Since the early 1970s, then, there has been a sizable de-
crease in keiretsu member firms' dependence on the main bank for
funding.3" This fact makes it clear that "Japanese industry is [not] tied
by unbreakable ropes to its banking partners, as is the case in [Germa-
ny] .... Once it was in industry's clear interest to break its ties, that is
what happened." '329 In addition, Professor Ramseyer suggests an alterna-
tive hypothesis for describing the phenomenon of cross-sharing, arguing
that banks' shareholdings are not the result of murky keiretsu motivations,
but rather of old-fashioned investment savvy. Banks learn of their clients'
profit potential when evaluating creditworthiness, thereby becoming privy
to a certain degree of insider information. Acting on this information
allows banks to "buy stock simply because they find it underpriced.""33
60.
- Relationship shares provide tax advantages; Japan's tax scheme is skewed in
favor of capital gains and intercorporate dividends. Id. at 360.
- Reduction in costs due to operational harmonization. Id. at 362-63.
- Pooling of human and technical resources. Id. at 364-65.
CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 146, at 46-47.
3 Roe, supra note 314, at 1937. For example, Deutsche Bank owned 41% of the
auto manufacturer Mercedes Benz. Id.
" Id. at 1958-59. See generally J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals:
Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 93 (1991)
(arguing that, contrary to popular belief, in Japanese financial markets "extralegal social
sanctions matter to a far smaller extent than generally believed.").
32 CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 146, at 46.
39 EMMOTT, supra note 111, at 104.
' J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 102
YALE LJ. 2005, 2013-14, 2020 (1993). Ramseyer reaches this conclusion by debunking
several popular explanations for shareholding. First, Ramseyer maintains, Japanese banks
do not seek to control or influence their customers in order to reduce risk. If this were
the goal, however, the result could be achieved just as effectively and more cheaply by
simply altering their banking activities (shorter term lending, refusing new loans to
troubled borrowers, etc.). Id. at 2007-08. Second, shareholding is not the result of a
desire to insulate firms from takeovers; such motivation is a "classic" invitation to
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F. U.S. Bank Financial Weakness
The 1980s were difficult for U.S. banks. They stumbled from one
banking disaster to the next - agricultural loans, energy-sector loans,
Lesser Developed Country (LDC) loans and the lingering recession of
1990 - and simultaneously faced increased competition from "non-
banks" and foreign banks.
The first banking disaster of the decade was the result of a stunning
growth in farm exports during the 1970s (rising from seven billion dollars
in 1970 to forty-one billion dollars in 1980), which lead to large bank
exposure in farm debt (including real estate).33" ' In the early 1980s a
combination of forces332 caused farm income to implode and with it
many banks. Between 1984 and 1987 over 200 banks with large exposure
to agricultural loans collapsed.333 Also during the decade, a similar, but
more intense set of events took place in the oil producing states. Between
1981 and 1985, oil prices ranged between thirty-one dollars per barrel and
forty-one dollars per barrel. Then, in the eight months between November
1985 and July 1986, oil plunged to twelve dollars per barrel.33 The
collapse of the oil states' economies was rapid and extensive.335 In
Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma 486 banks failed between 1984 and
1989.336 Finally, the increase in lending to LDCs during the 1970s re-
sulted with the "debt crisis" of the 1980s from which large money center
banks suffered huge losses.337 In the third quarter of 1987, large U.S.
banks added $21.2 billion to their loan loss reserves; Citibank alone set
aside three billion dollars.338
adverse selection - the banks' risk levels would increase because the most poorly run
firms would need takeover protection and, therefore, would seek the umbrella of
kieretsu shareholdings. Id. at 2009-10. Third, banks do not seek to enhance monitoring
of their borrowers by investing in stock; there is no evidence that the cost-benefit
analysis of such a premise. Id. at 2010-11. Finally, banks have no reason to buy stock
in order to insure long-term relationships; however, the very fact that shares can so
easily be sold indicates the weakness of this insurance. Id.
31 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at 1-23.
332 This combination included high production, unfavorable exchange rates, foreign
buyers' debt problems, and increased foreign production. Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
331 Id. at 1-23 to 1-24. The effect rippled throughout the oil states. Dallas had office
vacancy rates in excess of 30% in 1987. Id. In the fourth quarter of 1987, mortgage
foreclosures in Texas reached 15% of outstanding mortgages. Id.
336 Id. at 1-24.
3 Work & Stanglin, supra note 19, at 53.
3 Id. While no bank failures have been blamed primarily on the LDC debt
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Another factor in the weakened position of U.S. banks in the 1980s
was an increasingly more competitive financial market place. Between
1980 and 1989, banks' share of financial sector assets fell from thirty-
three percent to twenty-seven percent, after falling a mere one percent in
the preceding decade.339 During the 1980s mutual and money market
funds increased their share of the financial assets picture from 3.06% to
8.08%3 ° Moreover, banks faced increasing competition in financial
services from "non-banks" such as Sears, Roebuck and Co. and American
Express.34'
The 1990s began inauspiciously for banks. The overborrowing of the
1980s, especially in real estate, caused severe problems for banks when
the recession hit in 1990.342 Compounding the problem was the require-
ment that U.S. banks build their already damaged balance sheets to meet
higher capital standards required by the Basel Committee agreement.343
Hence, in 1990-91, U.S. banks actually reduced commercial and industrial
lending by 5.5%,3' contributing to the widely perceived "credit crunch"
that was thought to deepen the recession and delay the recovery.
The fact that, during the 1980s, U.S. banks did not expand into
Japan as rapidly as Japanese banks did in America may have been due to
the financial weakness of the U.S. banks.34 Such weakness is especially
significant when considering the costliness of entering the Japanese
market - a costliness colored by barriers such as the competitive advan-
tages of existing Japanese banks (size, existing customer base, and
keiretsu), the deflated dollar, and the infamous high cost of doing busi-
ness in Japan23 It cannot be a surprise that the extremely complex and
"frightfully" competitive Japanese banking markets have caused U.S.
banks to reassess their efforts to enter a market that is "clearly
overbanked and unprofitable." 347
problem, it did increase the "fragility of the banking system." RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 232, at 1-24.
339 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at 1-25.
3' Id. at 1-25, table 7.
' Work & Stanglin, supra note 19, at 53.
James R. Kraus, Foreign Banks Prove Staunch Allies for U.S. Firms, AM. BANK-
ER, Apr. 23, 1992, at 3A.
3 Id.
SId.
See Part Two, supra note 110, at 75-79 (prepared comments of Professor Kanda).
To purchase real estate in Tokyo is a mind-boggling expensive proposition. For
example, the Imperial Palace in the heart of Tokyo, in the late 1980s, was said to
have a market value greater than some states in the United States. Murphy, supra note
133, at 72.
' Joint Hearings, supra note 55, at 134-35 (prepared text of Eric W. Hayden). De-
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In short, added to the historic problems of foreign banks, e.g.,
limited access to local funds, restricted branching opportunities, and
onerous regulatory intervention are the sober realities of a shrinking
market and steadily soaring costs. It is particularly the latter, the result of
a strong yen and high fixed operating expenses, which has led several
major American banks to scale back, shut down, or re-focus their Japa-
nese operations. Further, because of the extraordinary price of acquisition,
"no American bank is . . . even remotely considering the purchase of a
local bank's branch network.'
348
VI. EVALUATING THE IMBALANCE
Another premise of the FTFSA is that the asset ownership imbalance
is harmful. This Section seeks to examine the validity of this assumption
by surveying, first, the concerns raised by the imbalance and, then, the
positive effects of foreign investment in U.S. banking.
A. Harmful Effects
Popular literature that addresses the imbalance tends to be general in
its assertions, focusing on a narrow set of facts and restating statistics.
During the 1980s there were many reports, articles, and speeches on
the subject of the growth of Japanese financial institutions in international
markets. While much of the literature is quite superficial, tending to be
purely descriptive at best, it often has an alarming undertone; that Japa-
nese financial institutions, in mysterious and inscrutable ways, are able to
underprice their services, exploiting unfair advantages never quite precise-
ly defined, by which they make life difficult for their competitors in
international and domestic markets alike.349
An example of such behavior is the concern of a sponsor of FTFSA,
Senator Reigle of Utah, that "control over a nation's financial institutions
means control over which businesses are provided with credit and allowed
to grow."'35 Within itself, this seems incontestably true. The notion,
however, falls apart on its most visceral word "control." Imbedded in the
word control is one of the following assumptions, none of which seem
true. The Japanese will use control over credit to deny credit to U.S.
concerns. This is odd, considering much of Japanese assets in the U.S.
spite the large number of banks in the United States, there are more branch locations
per 100,000 people in Japan. See G. BROKER, TRENDs IN BANKING STRUCrtuRE AND
REGULATION IN OECD CouNTRIEs: COMPETmON IN BANKING 24 (1989).
3" Joint Hearings, supra note 55, at 134-35 (prepared text of Eric W. Hayden).
3' Dufey, supra note 280, at 133.
3'0 Hearings, supra note 4, at 11.
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are in the form of subsidiaries that are separately capitalized. Moreover,
and most damaging of all, it assumes a monolithic Japanese actor that has
inscrutable motives." Of course, this seems improbable. Japanese banks
are self-interested business actors advancing their business interests as
they think proper.3
5 2
There are more genuine concerns that arise. First, if Japanese banks,
exploiting their competitive advantages, enter the U.S. market, and under-
price U.S. banks, both banks and U.S. taxpayers may be impacted. That
is, U.S. banks, losing their best customers to the low-cost competition,
will be forced into making loans to riskier clients. This in turn places a
bank in more serious danger of failure, and the U.S. taxpayer may be left
with the bill."3 Yet, this proposition neither recognizes the benefits to
consumers and businesses from lower prices on banking services, nor the
fact that such deleterious competition is only one portion of the overall
declining profitability of U.S. banks, which has been the result of a host
of competitive and macroeconomic factors. Therefore, it is important to
note that when the U.S. Treasury made recommendations for the im-
proved safety and soundness of U.S. banks, the solution was not to
eliminate competition with banks, but to increase the banks' ability to
compete. 4
Another risk with foreign investors is that their money is "less
stable.""35 That is, for external reasons or otherwise, they may need to
withdraw quickly from the market. 6 For instance, the Japanese may
have been responsible for the collapse of Continental Bank of Illinois in
1984 when, nervous about its soundness due to exposure to the energy
sector, they rapidly withdrew their funds.357 However, as a general prac-
tice the Japanese have been stable investors.5 Furthermore, subsidiary
companies, the bricks and mortar investment, are less liquid than U.S.
treasuries or deposits; hence the dangers of a Japanese abandonment of
" Japanese financial dominance is disturbing "not because Japan is conspiring to
rule the world or is creating unholy alliances to command the world economy."
Murphy, supra note 133, at 74.
" See Ramseyer, supra note 327, at 117 (explaining that for Japanese banks, "self-
interest may matter far more than many sociologists suggest, while reputational capital
and the prospect of repeated dealings may matter much less than some economists
suggest.").
... Hearings, supra note 4, at 11.
3 See generally RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at 1-74.
Sender, supra note 294.
35 Id.
37 Murphy, supra note 133, at 72.
358 Sender, supra note 294.
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the banking market seems remote.
A more intriguing concern raised about Japanese financial dominance
is that Japan "lacks the ideological and political commitment necessary to
fulfill the obligations that go with financial power." '359 In short, the
United States and Britain, when each ruled the commercial waves,
provided the leadership to encourage free trade, despite some cost to
themselves. Now that Japan is the largest creditor nation in the world,
there is fear that Japan is unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices to
advance the interests of free trade." The irony of this contention within
the context of the FTFSA debate, is that the FTFSA, as retaliatory
legislation, is hardly an example of U.S. willingness to sacrifice short-
term self-interest and provide free trade leadership-by-example.
B. Benefits from Foreign Investment
Foreign banks contribute to the U.S. economy in several ways. They
provide increased credit for U.S. borrowers; increased depth and liquidity
of financial markets; increased competition and innovation in banking
services; and they facilitate trade and investment (including significant
quantities of export financing).36' A Federal Reserve Board member has
stated: "U.S. markets are the most efficient, most innovative, and so-
phisticated" in the world and it "is not a coincidence that our markets are
also the most open to foreign competition."362
During the credit crunch of the early 1990s, foreign banks main-
tained their level of lending, while U.S. banks decreased theirs by twelve
percent.363 In 1990-91, U.S. banks decreased industrial lending by 5.5%.
Foreign banks, however, increased lending during that period by five
percent helping to mitigate this "credit crunch."3" Also, in that same
3 Murphy, supra note 133, at 74.
See generally id. at 72-83.
Senator Ted Kennedy has expressed a variation on this leadership theme, lamenting
the Japanese unwillingness to take a leadership role in foreign aid to poor nations: "I
just think that, in a country that is so wealthy and so powerful, there is the need for
better leadership." Joint Hearings, supra note 55, at 5.
36' Foreign Bank Operations in U.S. Provide Financial, Economic Benefits, Group
Says, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), Oct. 6, 1993, at 1677.
362 Joint Hearing, supra note 55, at 17-18 (comments of John P. LaWare).
3" For the 12 months ending June 30, 1991. Id. In dollar terms, in the period from
September 1990 to September 1991, U.S. bank industrial and commercial lending
decreased $26 billion, while foreign loans increased by $12.7 billion. Jonathan Marshall,
Behind the Credit Crunch Foreign Banks Make More U.S. Loans, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
12, 1992, at B1.
' Kraus, supra note 342, at 3A.
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period, foreign banks increased their U.S. loans for real estate by
35.7%.6 Highlighting the importance of foreign banks to the U.S.
economy, a Japanese bank, in an unusual move for the publicity shy
Japanese banks,3" ran an advertisement stating "[a]s long as American
industry waits in line for money, American workers will wait in line for
jobs."'367
Thus, one observer has found that "without question" the growth of
Japan's banks inside the United States has resulted in "substantial sav-
ings" for U.S. customers, resulting from lower interest rates, reduced
charges for non-credit services (such as those of trust and cash manage-
ment), as well as an increase in the number and range of services. 6 '
C. Summary
The asset ownership imbalance is not harmful for the United States,
and the benefits have been considerable. Moreover, the fact that concern
has arisen over the imbalance with Japan adds an unpleasant hint of
racism. Although the Japanese banks dramatically increased their presence
in California during the 1980s - from 1980 to 1988, their market share
increased from ten percent to twenty-five percent369 - total foreign
bank ownership increased by less than three percent.37 In essence, the
Japanese replaced the British, who abandoned the states in droves during
the 1980s.37" ' Similarly, while there is clearly a Japanese investment
imbalance in banking, as the numbers bear out, the Japanese are still only
the third largest investors in the United States, following the British and
the Dutch.3"
' Robert S. Cole, Foreign Banks Should Toot Their Own Horns, AM. BANKER,
June 5, 1992, at 6.
' See James Bates, Sanwa Bank Finds California Isn't So Golden, L.A. TIMES,
May 3, 1992, at D1.
Kraus, supra note 342, at 3A.
ROSE, supra note 171, at 148-49.
Orr, supra note 270, at 39.
370 Id.
"' British banks held 15% in 1982, but sold most holdings in the state during the
80s. Id. See, e.g., Bates, supra note 366, at D1 (Sanwa Bank, taking "advantage of the
British retreat from California," purchased the operations of Lloyd's Bank).
3 FRANTZ & COLLiNS, supra note 278, at 342.
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VII. CONSEQUENCE OF FTFSA AND CONCLUSION
A. General Limitations of FTFSA
The FTFSA, if applied against Japan, would limit the many benefits
of their investment in our banking market. Moreover, it is clear that the
ripple affect of FTFSA goes beyond Japan. Since many nations do
discriminate against the U.S. banking industry, the application of FTFSA
would mean that "almost everyone else with a financial-services industry
worth the name, would get nothing more than the access they have
today."3' Considering the many benefits provided by foreign investment
in banking, it should be asked if such a result is desirable. Furthermore,
the retaliatory nature of the FTFSA and its subsequent wide-ranging
implications, suggests that financial services protection cannot be viewed
in a void. Rather, it is merely part of a larger agenda of U.S. trade policy
- NAFTA and the Uruguay Round being just two examples - and U.S.
foreign policy.374
B. The FTFSA and Japan
Perhaps the most potent argument against FITSA is that a notion on
which it rests that the Japanese only respond to force,375 is false. Efforts
to force Japan into liberalization have not worked in the past and it is not
clear they will work now. First, the regulatory liberalization that the
Japanese have already made in their home market was the result of
domestic economic requirements, not simply foreign pressure.376 Second,
it is difficult to determine which nation is in the better position to apply
force to achieve its ends: the Japanese are the dominant financial power
in the world, sitting on the "largest cache of wealth ever assembled;" 3'
373 Id. at 82.
37' See generally Hearings, supra note 4, at 61-66.
3" Rep. Schumer of New York, a sponsor of FIFSA, has based his support of the
bill, in part, on the success of such an approach when Japanese securities dealers were
blocked from participation in U.S. markets during the mid-80s. The Japanese securities
markets were subsequently opened and Rep. Schumer places that success on U.S.
pressure. Hearings, supra note 4, at 21-23.
376 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 30; CARGILL & ROYAMA, supra note 146, at 16-17.
However, foreign pressure may have provided a convenient foil to provide the political
impetus for change. EMMOTT, supra note 111, at 98.
' Murphy, supra note 133, at 71. See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 21
(Representative Schumer "It should be perfectly clear.., that [the] era of U.S. eco-
nomic domination is over.")
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the United States, conversely, is sitting on the largest debt in the
world378 and has benefitted profoundly from the use of Japan's wealth
to fund its government379 and invest in its banks and services."' Thus,
with all the United States has to lose by implementation of FTFSA, it is
not at all clear whether in this endeavor the United States is, so to say,
in the driver's seat.
A final implication of the FrFSA is that, with it, the United States
is firmly claiming the moral low ground. 8' As noted, many of the
competitive disadvantages of U.S. banks must be laid at the steps of
Capitol Hill and the capitols of the individual states. And, while the
federal laws offer national treatment to foreign banks, the states, to whom
the current national banking laws defer, are not so generous. As of 1990,
there were still four states that did not even allow banks from other states
to enter their territory.382 It seems inappropriate that the United States
adopt protectionist legislation in an area in which it does not have the
cleanest hands, and at a time when it is attempting to play a leadership
role in such free trade initiatives as NAFTA and GATT.
C. Conclusion
The trouble with FTFSA is that there is no problem for it to correct.
In terms of regulation, the Japanese offer U.S. banking companies nation-
al treatment. Although the Japanese have in the past been discriminatory,
just as has the United States, any future imbalance in ownership is due
to Japanese customary banking behavior and macroeconomic factors (such
as the U.S. budget deficit, the value of the dollar, and the behavior of the
two nations stock markets), and U.S. laws that hamper the growth and
profitability of its own banks.
Moreover, it is difficult to determine who gains from the FTFSA.
From a consumer standpoint in the United States, the FTFSA is mean-
378 Hearings, supra note 4, at 21.
3 Senator Ted Kennedy has lamented the fact that the United States has a difficult
time getting "tough" with Japan because it is "completely addicted" to debt, and Japan
alone bought $50 billion in U.S. securities. Joint Hearing, supra note 55, at 16-17.
" For example, Japanese banks provide 20% of all credit in California. Murphy,
supra note 133, at 72.
38 Federal Reserve Board Governor LaWare asserts that the passage of the FTFSA
would mean that the United States could "no longer hold to a principled position in
advocating liberalization in international financial circles." Joint Hearings, supra note
55, at 18-19.
3&2 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at 50, XVII-7 - XVII-8, table 1 (listing Ha-
waii, Kansas, North Dakota, and Montana as the four states disallowing interstate
banking).
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ingless because competence, not nationality, is what is important in
banking.3 From an American investor's point of view, the FTFSA
artificially limits the universe of buyers for the investors' bank stock
holdings. From a depositor's point of view, national regulations, applied
evenly to foreign-owned entities and domestically owned entities, can
insure that banks behave in a safe and sound manner. In short, nobody
gains from the FTFSA, except, perhaps, advocates of simple solutions and
seekers of scapegoats.
3 EMMoTr, supra note 11, at 146.
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APPENDIX A
MISCELLANEOUS JAPANESE BANKS
I. LONG-TERM BANKS
There are two types of long-term credit institutions, Long-Term
Credit Banks and Trust Banks. The Long-Term Credit Banks, of which
there are only three,384 can accept deposits only from their borrowers,
local governments, and other public bodies. 85
Lending for long-term needs, such as plant and equipment,386 Long-
Term Credit Banks played an extremely important role in Japan's rapid
growth after World War H.387
Trust Banks, seven of which are Japanese-owned,3" obtain their
funds from trusts,38 9 and lend to corporations for capital investments."9
I. BANKS SERVING SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED BORROWERS
The Japanese system of banking contains an odd-lot collection of
financial institutions that service specific fields or small and medium-sized
companies.
.. Industrial Bank of Japan, Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, and Nippon Credit
Bank. BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, app. 1, at 4. By assets, these banks
are, respectively, the 8th, 17th, and 40th largest in the world. Worl's Largest Banks,
supra note 18, at 115, 116, 118.
" Suzuki, supra note 152, at 202. BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at
25.
3 Id.
' Suzuki, supra note 152, at 201.
318 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 25.
m "The trust business is a set of transactions in which a trust owner transfers, through
a set of legal acts (act of trust), the property rights of his own property to another
party (the trustee) and at the same time entrusts the management and disposal of these
assets to the trustee for a specified purpose... for the benefit of society, himself, or
a third party (the beneficiary).'
Suzuki, supra note 152, at 206.
390 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 25.
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A. Banks Serving Small and Medium-Sized Companies
Sogo Banks
Sogo Banks (of which there are sixty-eight) act very much like
Regional Banks, taking deposits, lending, and transferring funds.39' Their
-clients, however, are restricted to doing business with 300 employees or
fewer, and have a maximum capital of 800 million yen.
Shinkin Banks
There are approximately 455 non-profit organizations carrying out the
same type of business as ordinary banks and Sogo banks.3" All busi-
ness is conducted on a membership basis.394 Membership is restricted to
companies with 300 employees or less (and their workers) which have
maximum capitalization of 400 million yen. Membership is further re-
stricted to residents within limited geographic areas.395
All Shinkin Banks, in turn, are members of the Zenshinren Bank,
which lends, takes deposits, and transfers money between its member
banks, and serves the borrowing needs of local governmental bodies and
non-profit organizations.396 It acts as a banker's bank, lending to Shinkin
Banks with capital shortages with monies gotten from deposits derived
from Shinkin banks with deposit surpluses.39 ' The Zenshinren Bank also
acts as a "mutual aid" system for the Shinkin Banks, providing low-
interest loans to troubled Shinkin banks when necessary. 98 Zenshinren
Bank is, in asset terms, the sixty-second largest bank in the world.3
Credit Cooperatives
Credit Cooperatives are similar to Shinkin banks, except that they are
organized as for-profit mutual benefit companies.' All Credit Coopera-
tives are members of the National Federation of Credit Cooperatives, an
39 Id. at 25-26.
392 Id. at 26.
393 Id.
... Suzuki, supra note 152, at 218.
395 Id.
3 6 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 26.
31 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 223-24.
391 Id. at 224.
311 World's Largest Banks, supra note 18, at 115, 120.
' Suzuki, supra note 152, at 227. In 1985, there were 448 such institutions. Id. at
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organization that serves the same purpose as Zenshinren Bank." ' The
regulation of these institutions is done by the prefectural governments, not
the MOF.
Labor Banks
Labor banks are "cooperative-type financial institutions"' that
"carry out the financial business that is necessary in order to promote the
improvement of living standards for workers and to promote the joint
welfare activities of organizations such as labor unions, [and] consumer
co-operatives.. .. "'
The main business of Labor Banks is to accept deposits from
members and governments and lend to labor organizations and members
of those organizations.' Membership is limited to labor organizations
(and their constituent members) that are within a geographic area.'
The Rokinren Bank acts in the same capacity of the Zenshinren
banks for the benefit of Labor Banks.'
Shokochukin Bank
Shokochukin Bank was designed to service the needs of credit
cooperatives formed by small businesses.' Its lending is limited to
member organizations, their constituent members, and governmental
bodies; deposit taking is limited to member organizations' and govern-
mental bodies. The government supplies part of the Bank's capital and,
although the bank is a private institution, it is strongly involved with its
operations (the MOF appoints directors, for example).410 The interest
rates are set by the government.41' In terms of assets, this bank is the
fifieth largest in the world.412
40 Id.
4 Id. at 225.
4 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 27.
' Suzuki, supra note 152, at 228.
40 Id.
4M Id.
4 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 28.
' Suzuki, supra note 152, at 230.
4 Id. at 231.
410 Id. at 230.
411 See id.
422 World's Largest Banks, supra note 18, at 115, 118.
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Banks Serving the Agricultural, Forestry, and Fishing Industries
Each of these three industries has special financial institutions set up
to service its needs. The banks, of which there are over 4,000, are
cooperative in form, with management entrusted to the members.413
Nearly all persons engaged in these industries are members. The
primary purpose of the institutions is to take deposits and lend to mem-
bers.41
5
Each prefecture maintains a federation of cooperatives, with the
federation taking deposits and making loans to members banks. 416 In
turn each federation of cooperatives is a member of the Norinchukin
Bank.417 The Norinchukin Bank serves the same function as Zenshinren
and Rokinren Banks. Norinchukin went private in 198641' but still acts
as a conduit of government aid to these sectors of the economy.419
Norinchukin is Japan's largest institutional investor' and, in asset size,
ranks as the ninth largest bank in the world.42'
III. POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM
The first financial intermediary in Japan, established in 1875, the
PSS was designed to promote savings by individuals and to supply funds
for industrial capital.4' Even today, the system is administered by the
Postal Ministry and not the MOF.4 There are several features which
set the PSS apart from other financial institutions. First, it is extremely
large. There are 24,000 branches - post offices424 - that by the mid-
1980s held thirty percent of all personal deposits in Japan."z Second, it
is an agency of the government and, therefore, it does not need to make
413 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 235.
414 Id. at 237.
415 Id.
416 Id. at 236.
47 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 30.
418 Id. at 32.
419 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 232 n.6.
420 EMMOTr, supra note 111, at 108.
" World's Largest Banks, supra note 18, at 115, 116.
422 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 35; Suzuki, supra note 152, at
288. Postal banking systems are common throughout Europe. See generally Europe's
Postal Banks; Under Fire, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1992, at 81.
4' EMMOTr, supra note 111, at 100; Suzuki, supra note 152, at 149.
424 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 288.
415 EMMOTr, supra note 111, at 101.
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a profit.4' Third, until 1988, interest on deposits, which were limited to
five million yen, was not taxed and interest rates were set by the Postal
Ministry.427 After 1988, interest on deposits have been taxed at the same
rate, with limited exceptions,4' as other financial institutions.42 9 Fourth,
the Postal Ministry controls the rate of interest on deposits, although free
market interest rates are gradually being introduced.43 Finally, the PSS
has grown beyond its deposit taking function, offering such services as
automatic payment for utility bills, loans backed by PSS savings ac-
counts,43' automatic wage deposit, use of automatic teller machines, and
automatic remittance of dividends.432
Needless to say, this system has often been accused of creating
unfair competition.433 Moreover, the system is not popular among Jap-
anese private bankers.434 There is a growing consensus that the system
has outgrown its usefulness and is in need of a "thorough review."'43
426 Id. at 101.
427 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 35. Because deposits were not
taxed, Japanese tax officials were not permitted access to the deposit records. As a
result, falsified accounts were rampant and the System had more accounts than the
combined sum of all men, women, and children in Japan. EMMOTT, supra note 111, at
101.
' The disabled, those over 65 years of age, and working single mothers earn
interest tax free. Id. at 102.
429 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 35.
430 EMMOTT, supra note 111, at 101-02.
41 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 35.
42 Suzuki, supra note 152, at 288-99.
433 Robert A. Feldman, The Future of Japanese Banking, JAPANESE FINANCIAL
GROWTH, 1, 24 (Charles A.E. Goodhart & George Sutija eds., 1990).
4 EMMorr, supra note 111, at 101 (quoting one City Banker as calling the Postal
System "the cancer on the Japanese financial system.").
4 BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN, supra note 132, at 35. See also Feldman, supra note
436, at 11.
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